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 ABSTRACT 
  
THREE ESSAYS ON UTILIZING SPATIAL ECONOMETRICS IN 
NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS RELATED TO WATER, 
HEALTH, AND ENERGY 
Zohreh Erfanian 
 
Spatial interaction and the locational structure between observations have recently 
gained more attention in the field of econometrics for both cross-sectional and panel data 
analyses. Compared to a non-spatial economic model, a spatial model relaxes the 
assumption of independency in observations. This research will apply spatial econometrics 
modeling in three different fields in applied economics: 1) water charge and minimum 
monthly access charge in West Virginia municipalities, 2) Naloxone access law and opioid 
overdose deaths among the U.S. states, and 3) 𝑃𝑀2.5 concentrations and asthma 
hospitalizations in Pennsylvania counties. Based on the nature of water resource imposing 
spillovers in water charge model is inevitable, likewise Naloxone law and 𝑃𝑀2.5 
concentrations. We expect to see a significant spillover effects in water charge and 
minimum water access charge as well as Naloxone law and asthma prevalence among 
observations.  
In Chapter 2, we apply linear and log-log functional forms plus spatial econometric 
analyses to a 2014 dataset of 125 municipal water utilities in West Virginia to investigate 
the determinants of charges for water use and access. The water charges models are 
consistent with the theory of water cost determination as water source, debt, and economies 
of size and scale influence what consumers pay for water. Based on model results, 
groundwater use by utilities is estimated to save household customers in West Virginia 
over $12.6 million annually.  The results for the spatial model indicate that there are 
moderate spillover effects for both water and minimum access charges among utilities. 
West Virginia households using municipal water typically pay far below the OECD 
standard of 3% to 5% of household income which may explain why socioeconomic factors 
do not influence monthly minimum charges. A manuscript based on this essay is accepted 
for the publication for in the journal, Water Economics & Policy.   
Chapter 3 contains an essay examining naloxone access laws.  Opioid overdose is 
the leading cause of unintentional death in the U.S. Naloxone is a medicine that reverses 
the overdose. The second essay investigates the effects of Naloxone access laws on opioid 
overdose death rates.  Analyses reveal that when broken down by access law provisions, 
there exist positive effects on overdose death rates depending upon the provision.  The 
results indicate that Naloxone access provisions have regional impacts by influencing 
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overdose death rates neighboring states.  Looking across multiple provisions, our findings 
provide no statistical evidence that these laws reduce opioid overdose death rates. This 
essay has been published in Review of Regional Studies.  
Finally, Chapter 4 is an essay relating 𝑃𝑀2.5 concentrations and asthma 
hospitalization across Pennsylvania counties.  Ambient air pollution adversely impacts 
human health.  According to the World Health Organization, 235 million people around the 
world currently suffer from asthma, which includes approximately 25 million in the United 
States. There is substantial epidemiological evidence linking outdoor air pollution and 
asthma symptoms, more specifically particulate matter concentrations and asthma. Based 
upon county level data from 2001-2014, a spatial panel framework based upon prevailing 
wind patterns is used to investigate the direct and indirect impacts of PM2.5 concentration 
levels on asthma hospitalization rates in Pennsylvania. This model controls for population 
density, precipitation, per capita income, and smoking rate. Results show that PM2.5 
concentrations have both positive direct and indirect effects on asthma hospitalization rates. 
Varying with county population size, a one μg/m3 increase in PM2.5 will add asthma 
hospitalization costs between $3.1M (Philadelphia County) and $37,732 (Cameron 
County).  This study highlights the need for a more accurate impact analysis of ambient air 
pollution on asthma that reflects the impacts on neighboring regions as well. A one μg/m3 
increase in PM2.5 concentrations throughout all counties in Pennsylvania raises the number 
of annual asthma hospitalizations by over 1,200, with 26.8% of this increase occurring due 
to spillover effects.  In the case of asthma hospitalization rates from PM2.5 pollution, an 
appropriate wind direction algorithm is important to identify spillover effects across 
counties. This essay has been under review in Journal of Regional Analysis and Policies. 
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CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE 
Spatial interaction and the locational structure between observations have recently 
gained more attention in the field of econometrics for both cross-sectional and panel data 
analyses. Given a location to any observation in the system, spatial econometrics 
specifies, estimates, and tests how the magnitude of a variable of interest would be 
determined by the value of the same variable at other locations in the system (Anselin, 
2001).  Compared to a non-spatial economic model, a spatial model relaxes the 
assumption of independency in observations.  Spatially correlated observations could be 
zip codes, cities, municipalities, counties, states, and countries (Elhorst, 2014). In this 
study, applying different level of spatially correlated observations I model spatial 
spillovers in topics related to water, health and environment.  
Purpose of this study 
The overall aim of this study is to empirically demonstrate, at the municipal, 
county and a state level, how the spatial analysis may help to find a more accurate results 
while evaluating the impacts of exogenous variables, shocks and policies in different 
fields. This study is composed of three essays. 
Aim of Essay 1: Examine the factors impact the water charges and access in West 
Virginia municipalities applying a spatial model 
The first essay describes the factors that explain water charges and access in West 
Virginia municipalities.   
The specific objectives for this essay are listed below: 
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1. Given the dramatic differences in water charges observed for municipal 
utilities throughout the state of West Virginia, the main objective of this 
research is to investigate the factors that explain water charge differences.   
2. The next question addressed in this research is about how minimum access 
charges for water provision (independent from the water volume 
consumption) account for social equity concerns across municipalities.   
3. Explore whether there are any spillover effects in water charges and the 
minimum water access across municipalities. 
Aim of Essay 2: Examine state-level variations in opioid overdose deaths as a result of 
the Naloxone access law with an application of spatial regression 
The second essay focuses on one of the most important recent national challenges, 
opioid crisis.  Opioid overdose is the leading cause of unintentional death in the U.S. 
(Visconti et al., 2015). While opioid epidemic is a phenomenon that all the states are 
suffering from, there are regions consist of a cluster of states that experience a higher rate 
of opioid overdoses. It is plausible that the opioid related Naloxone access law state level 
policy in one state can affect the opioid overdose deaths of the neighboring states because 
of cross bordering the drugs. Therefore, using a spatial econometrics model this study 
aims to: 
1. Evaluate the effectiveness of state level Naloxone overdose prevention laws 
on overdose deaths in the U.S.  
2. Explore whether there are any spillover effects in the Naloxone access law 
and the overdose deaths across states. 
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Aim of Essay 3: Examine county-level asthma hospitalization rate and 𝑷𝑴𝟐.𝟓 
concentrations: An application of spatial Durbin panel approach  
The third essay examines the complex relationship between 𝑃𝑀2.5 concentrations 
and asthma hospitalization outcome. Over the last decades, air pollution has changed 
from less concentrations of SO2 and coarse particles toward more traffic-related air 
pollutants (TAP) (i.e., nitrogen oxides (NOx), small particles and organic compounds) 
(Pénard-Morand et al., 2010). While many researchers investigate the effects of short-
term and long-term exposure to PM and resulting asthma symptoms (Silverman and Ito, 
2010; Samoli et al., 2011; Iskandar et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2015), further research is 
needed to investigate the presence of “uncompensated spillovers” of 𝑃𝑀2.5 concentrations 
on asthma hospitalization. Therefore, using a Spatial Durbin Model, the objectives are to: 
1. Identify and estimate the impacts of 𝑃𝑀2.5 concentrations on asthma 
prevalence across counties in the state of Pennsylvania. 
2. Check whether or not there is any spillover effects from 𝑃𝑀2.5 concentrations 
and asthma prevalence across counties in Pennsylvania. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Anselin, L. (2001). Spatial econometrics. A companion to theoretical 
econometrics, 310330. 
 
Elhorst, J. P. (2014). Spatial econometrics: from cross-sectional data to spatial panels (pp. 
20-25). Heidelberg: Springer. 
 
Visconti, A. J., Santos, G. M., Lemos, N. P., Burke, C., & Coffin, P. O. (2015). Opioid 
overdose deaths in the city and county of San Francisco: prevalence, distribution, 
and disparities. Journal of Urban Health, 92(4), 758-772. 
 
Pénard-Morand, C., Raherison, C., Charpin, D., Kopferschmitt, C., Lavaud, F., Caillaud, 
D., & Annesi-Maesano, I. (2010). Long-term exposure to close-proximity air 
pollution and asthma and allergies in urban children. European Respiratory 
Journal, 36(1), 33-40. 
 
Silverman, R. A., & Ito, K. (2010). Age-related association of fine particles and ozone 
with severe acute asthma in New York City. Journal of Allergy and Clinical 
Immunology, 125(2), 367-373. 
 
Samoli, E., Nastos, P. T., Paliatsos, A. G., Katsouyanni, K., & Priftis, K. N. (2011). 
Acute effects of air pollution on pediatric asthma exacerbation: evidence of 
association and effect modification. Environmental research, 111(3), 418-424. 
 
Iskandar, A., Andersen, Z. J., Bønnelykke, K., Ellermann, T., Andersen, K. K., & 
Bisgaard, H. (2011). Coarse and fine particles but not ultrafine particles in urban 
air trigger hospital admission for asthma in children. Thorax, thoraxjnl-2011. 
 
Zhang, Q., Qiu, Z., Chung, K. F., & Huang, S. K. (2015). Link between environmental 
air pollution and allergic asthma: East meets West. Journal of thoracic 
disease, 7(1), 14. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
CHAPTER 2: CHARGES FOR WATER AND ACCESS: WHAT 
EXPLAINS THE DIFFERENCES AMONG WEST VIRGINIA 
MUNICIPALITIES? 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Water is a basic resource that is vital to the existence of life. Because of this, provision of 
potable water is often discussed as a basic human right (United Nations, 2010).  While a renewable 
resource, the global water cycle implies essentially a fixed water supply (Renzetti, 2012).  
Increasing demands for water strain the ability of communities to achieve sustainable management. 
One of the main goals in a sustainable water planning system is providing adequate supplies of 
clean water for all users at a reasonable cost (Gleick, 1998). According to the World Bank (2015), 
99% of Americans have access to an improved water source; however, consumers pay vastly 
different amounts for the same volume of water. For instance, Walton (2015) provides water price 
data for 30 major U.S. cities with a range for the same volume of water from $23.26 (in Fresno, 
CA) to $153.78 (in Santa Fe, NM).  These price data were calculated as a monthly bill for a family 
of four using 100 gallons per person per day. 
Provision of clean and reliable water is a key element of any developed society. Water 
markets are mostly dominated by monopolists or at least contains monopoly elements (Klein, 
1996). The lack of any feasible and realistic competition makes it necessary to have a regulatory 
mechanism in place to deal with the loss of social welfare imposed by a monopoly market. In West 
Virginia, the provision of water services occurs as a regulated monopoly. The West Virginia Public 
Service Commission (WV PSC) provides oversight for this necessary government function to 
ensure that consumers have access to safe and reliable water supplies at reasonable rates. Through 
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the WV PSC, municipal utilities operate as monopolies within their communities because of the 
capital intensive structure of operating a water utility.   
Pricing regulation by the WV PSC is based on the costs faced by water providers.  
However, when water charges across West Virginia municipalities are examined on the basis of 
cost to residential customer for 4,500 gallons, a more than five-fold difference is observed (from 
$13.26 in Vienna to $71.89 in Matoaka) (WV PSC, 2014).  This range is comparable to that found 
at a national level even with a much more homogenous climate in West Virginia.  Figure 1 
demonstrates the spatial distribution of charges across West Virginia municipal utilities.  
Given these dramatic differences in water charges and a growing concern for the municipal 
agencies’ actions for supplying drinking water (Renzetti, 1999; Rijsberman, 2006; Ercin and 
Hoekstra, (2014); World Economic Forum, 2015; Mekonnen and Hoekstra, 2016), our main 
objective in this research is to examine what factors explain the cost differences among municipal 
water utilities across the state of West Virginia. We use a cost-based approach to determine what 
factors explain water pricing differences.  
In this research, we use the term water charge as the concept to be examined.  Price and 
charge both involve the element of money, but price describes how a consumer must pay to gain an 
additional unit of product or service, while charge is the total amount paid to acquire a certain 
quantity of a product or service.  In terms of water supply in the United States, water charge is a 
way to standardize the acquisition of water across a multitude of pricing structures.  Water utility 
pricing structures often include a minimum charge and either fixed or variable unit charges 
(usually on a per 1,000-gallon basis).  This argument, as first stated by Coase (1946), notes that the 
efficient price in a regulated market needs to be expressed as a two-part tariff. The volumetric 
charge equals to marginal cost and the fixed fees equal to each customer’s share of fixed costs.  
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Besides this main objective, we ask another question about whether social equity concerns 
are linked to minimum charges for access to water provision (independent from the water volume 
consumption) among water utilities.  We will investigate whether minimum charges by utilities 
vary based upon socioeconomic circumstances within a community.  Similar to water charges, 
minimum charges differ across municipal utilities.  For example, there are 30 municipalities in 
West Virginia whose minimum charge to consumers is zero, while the highest minimum charge in 
our sample is at the municipality of Sistersville where households have $39 per bill as the 
minimum charge.   
Kanakoudis and Tsitsifli (2014) point out that assessment of minimum charges is not 
socially fair. Fairness matters to consumers, especially fairness in distribution is a concern in 
political philosophy.  Regardless of income level, all individuals should have access to water. In 
the scope of fairness literature, consumers need to pay for water based on their ability to pay.  This 
is an issue that we address in this study by examining minimum charges by water utilities as the 
amount that households are obliged to pay per month to have access to water.  These charges 
generate a secure source of revenue for the local water utilities that enable them to cover, for 
example, water losses in their network.   
Finally, we introduce a spatial aspect to models that explain water and minimum access 
charges.  We add geographic variables to investigate the spatial implications of water charges. 
Commonly, municipal utilities located in the same county or region will have similarities in their 
primary source of water, topography, cost of living, etc.  These similarities among municipalities in 
a region may have effects on either water charges or minimum charge determinants within a spatial 
framework.   
10 
 
Thus, this study contributes to the literature in three ways.  First, we introduce spatial 
characteristics to the model to determine the extent to which neighboring municipal utilities 
influence the municipal water charges.  Second, we consider geography and morphology attributes 
in the water charges model.  Lastly, we test to see whether social equity considerations explain 
minimum access charges to water provision.  The next four sections cover:  previous literature 
related to the economy of water, conceptual and empirical models along with methods, and data 
utilized in this research.  In the last two sections, we provide the results and then conclude with a 
discussion of the implications from this research. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Among the studies on water issues include:  pricing and costs, utility ownership and 
efficiency, utility regulatory policies, and social equity.  We will focus on these issues in separate 
sub-sections below. 
Water pricing and costs 
Goldstein (1986) argued that potable water is an inexpensive, virtually limit-less resource 
in many areas of the United States.  According to Goldstein, accessibility and availability of the 
water supply is the reason why water cost is not a substantial concern in the U.S.  After 30 years of 
changes in availability of water resources, the Goldstein argument of limit-less water supplies is 
questionable (e.g. Boyer et al. (2015) note examples in the western U.S.), but his main 
recommendation of setting water charges in a way that reflects the full cost of providing water is 
still accurate and valuable.  From Feigenbaum and Teeples (1983), who recommend a hedonic cost 
function for water provided by public versus private, to Bae (2007), who investigates institutional 
factors influencing the water pricing system, there is a considerable amount of research evaluating 
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water pricing in the U.S.  These pricing structures involve different systems of either a uniform 
block rate, decreasing block rate, increasing block rate, or increasing and declining block rate.   
While Renwick and Archibald (1998) find that price-based policies are as effective as non-
price policies, there is a clear trend in water conservation policies towards volumetric charging 
(Inman and Jeffery, 2006; Randolph and Troy, 2008; Millock and Nauges, 2010; Polycarpou and 
Zacharizdis, 2013).  Baerenklau et al. (2014) is an example of investigating a new water rate 
mechanism (increasing block rate water budgets), which considers household-specific 
characteristics and environmental conditions in setting a more efficient block rate.  Sanchez-
Martinez and Rodriguez-Ferrero (2016) argue that natural hydrological conditions require 
application of a complex, integrated and highly developed water management and pricing systems.  
Finally, two influential studies for this research include Bae (2007) and Antonioli and 
Filippini (2001).  Bae (2007) examines factors influencing the cost of water provision.  He 
separates the influential factors into four major categories: (1) institutional arrangements and 
characteristics, (2) government regulations, (3) supply factors and characteristics, and (4) natural 
environment and local characteristics.  The maximum capacity of water production and treatment, 
water sources, water loss during water production, and rate structures are the explanatory variables 
that Bae uses to explain cost variation over a sample of 259 utilities across the U.S.  For monthly 
residential water charges, positive impacts on cost are found for variables concerning the volume 
of water sold, use of increasing block rates, long-term utility debt, water loss, implementation of 
prior appropriation doctrine, and providing other infrastructure services.  Variables with negative 
impacts include ground water as a source, water treatment capacity, daily water production, and a 
combined bill with other services.  Antonioli and Filippini (2001) recommend controlling for 
geographical and morphological variables in cost model in order to achieve more accurate results. 
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Water efficiency, ownership, and utility regulation 
Among water efficiency and ownership studies, Teeples and Glyer (1987) estimate three 
cost models examining water delivery systems to compare ownership efficiency.  The authors find 
that as specification improves, differences between public and private water supplies reduce to 
insignificance.  Renzetti and Dupont (2004) find the same results in their study. They emphasize a 
lack of evidence for differences in performance of public versus private utilities.  Also Bel et al. 
(2010) find there is no empirical evidence that private ownership is more efficient than public 
ownership utilities and Carvalho (2012) points out that this result is not surprising because of a 
wide range of different circumstances in each case study. 
As mentioned by other water economists, Savenije (2002) argues that because a large 
investment (high fixed cost) is needed to supply water at an economy of scale, water provision is a 
natural monopoly market.  In particular, residential water supply is also considered a natural 
monopoly (Müller, 2015).  As Holland (2006) points out, the owner of a water supply system is 
interested in shrinking the deliveries in order to increase the profit by a higher cost of water 
provided to customers.  To deal with derived market failure, governmental regulation is required to 
control the monopoly structure of the water market (Guerrini et al, 2011; Pahl-Wostl, 2015; 
Suárez-Varela et al., 2017; Araral et al., 2017).  
Water and equity  
Efficiency and equity tradeoffs are a well-defined topic within the foundations of welfare 
economics (Boadway, 1976; Zajac, 1978; Le Grand, 1990; Kritikos and Bolle, 2001).  The trade-
off between efficiency and equity is considerable when there is a high level of fixed cost of 
providing services in markets such as energy, water, and transportation (Borenstein and Davis, 
2012).  Studies that investigate equity and efficiency in water supply include Bakker (2001), 
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Garcia-Valinas (2005), and Porcher (2014).  Bakker (2001) discusses economic equity versus 
equalization in water policy. Distinguishing between these two concepts, he explains that based on 
the equity principle, users should be charged according to their ability to pay.  Following Bakker, 
Garcia-Valinas (2005) uses the same equity argument to propose a tariff rate which achieves 
efficiency, equity, financial aspects and/or public acceptability and transparency.  The author 
controls for water supplied, labor and capital cost, and the length of the pipeline.  Porcher (2014) 
discusses the effects of rebalancing water rates from current tariff to Coasian tariffs in France.  The 
result is a lower bill for consumers and strong distributional consequences.  
Water affordability gains growing attention in recent years (Mack and Wrase, 2017); 
Komarulzaman, 2017; Teodoro, 2018; Vanhille et al., 2018; Wutich et al., 2017). The Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development recommends that water bills not exceed 3-5% of 
annual household income (OECD, 2003; OECD, 2010).  Bithas (2008) argues that increasing block 
rates do not promote social equity and recommends the number of members in each household to 
be considered in setting water cost.  Finally, the Consumer Utilities Advocacy Centre (2012) 
contends that social equity was traditionally an important concern in the urban water pricing 
system, while nowadays policies focus on different aspects such as water efficiency, financial 
sustainability, and cost recovery.  He recommends a two-part tariff: a fixed supply charge and a 
variable charge.  Based on household income or other economic circumstances, the requisite social 
support policy should be considered in a fixed charge.  
MODEL AND METHODS 
As motivated by Bae (2007), the general form of a model that explains variations in water 
charges to customers from a municipal water utility includes four categories of variables that 
influence the cost of water provision:  
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𝑊𝐶𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑄𝑖, 𝐼𝑛𝑖 , 𝐸𝑛𝑖 , 𝐺𝑒𝑖 )                                                                                   (1) 
where (WC) is the water charges for a fixed volume of water that customers pay in return for 
provision of water; (Q) is the quantity of water sold by the water utility; (In) is a vector of 
institutional and cost of providing service characteristics of water utilities; (En) is the index of 
water quality provided by the utility; and (Ge) is geographical characteristics of the area served 
by the utility.  
As described in the introduction, the WC variable reflects the cost to a residential 
consumer from consumption of 4,500 gallons of water.  This charge is for a consistent water 
quantity across municipal water utilities and represents an average cost faced by residential 
customers.  Following Kim (1987), Kim and Clark (1988), Fabbri and Fraquelli (2000), Mizutani 
and Urakami (2001), Filippini (2008), and Ansink and Houba (2012), we control for both 
economies of size and scale to account for quantity of water sold.  Each of these studies 
distinguish between output scale and network scale effects (economies of size and scale).  Sold 
water and sold water per capita reflect different (although related) issues of economies of size and 
scale aspects for municipal water utilities.  Also, inclusion of sold water better accounts for water 
purchases by surrounding communities and public service districts that impact the volume of 
water produced by the utility.      
In the institutional category, we utilize variables of primary water source (i.e. ground 
water, surface water, or purchased water), network line length, long term debt, and volume of 
water loss in water production cycles.  Bae (2007) controlled for different water right doctrines 
(i.e. riparian rights versus prior appropriation), different ownerships for water supply (i.e., public 
water versus private water systems), and different pricing mechanisms (i.e. uniform rates, 
increasing block rate, or decreasing block rates).  Our observations are within a single state where 
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more than 80% of all municipal water utilities follow a declining block rate structure.  Since there 
is no significant heterogeneity in block rates, our final estimation does not control for this 
variable.  
The water quality category includes a variable that reflects water quality violations 
experienced by utilities.  For the geography category, we include variables reflecting elevation 
changes and differences in slope within a municipality’s boundary along with population density.  
Table 1 shows the explanatory variables considered in each category. 
Table 1. Categorization of explanatory variables 
Variable Category 
Sold water (million gallons) Quantity 
Sold water per customer (million gallons) Quantity 
Network length (miles/customer) Institutional 
Debt ($1,000/customer) Institutional 
Water loss (%) Institutional 
Ground water as source Institutional 
Violations (number in 2014) Water quality 
Elevation difference (ft.) Geographical 
Average slope (%)  Geographical 
Population density (person/sq. mile) Geographical 
 
Based on equation (1) and the variables described above, an empirical equation for water 
charges is written as: 
𝑊𝐶𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖
2 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑃𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑃𝐶𝑖
2 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖 +
𝛽7𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽8𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽9𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽10𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐷𝑖
2 + 𝛽11𝑉𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 +
𝛽12𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                                                                                                                (2) 
   The error term (εi) is assumed to comply with the BLUE standard assumptions of 
expected value equal to zero, homoscedasticity, independently distributed and not correlated with 
other error terms or the independent variables.  However, as pointed out by Guyomard and 
Vermersch (1989) and Filippini (1996), estimation of a translog variable cost function with a high 
number of explanatory variables can lead to multicollinearity problems.  Thus, we evaluate three 
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functional forms for the water charges model: a linear with quadratic variables, a Cobb-Douglas 
(log of dependent and independent variables), and a spatial model. A total of ten different 
specifications are estimated and evaluated with adjusted R2, Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), 
Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC), and Hannan-Quinn criteria to select the best specification.  
The first six models have a linear functional form and the remaining four are log-log form.  A 
Davidson-MacKinnon J test is applied to choose between linear and log-log model specifications. 
Our approach here is to initially estimate a non-spatial water charges model and then 
control for spatial spillovers by estimating another model in a spatial framework. According to the 
LeSage and Pace (2009) and Elhorst (2014), non-spatial econometric estimation is based upon 
observed values being independent of location with no correlation between neighbors.  In non-
spatial models, each observation has a mean of 𝑥𝑖𝛽 and a random component  𝜀𝑖 where the 
observation 𝑖 represents a region or point in space at one location and is considered to be 
independent of observations in other locations, i.e. 𝐸(𝜀𝑖 𝜀𝑗) = 𝐸(𝜀𝑖)𝐸(𝜀𝑙) = 0.  
However, in many cases, this independence assumption is not applicable so that 
observations at different points or regions are dependent (LeSage and Pace 2009).  Suppose we 
have two neighbors (regions) 𝑖 and 𝑗.  If these two regions are spatially correlated and normality 
for error terms is assumed, then: 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝜌𝑖𝑦𝑗 + 𝑥𝑖𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖                                                                                                (3) 
𝑦𝑗 = 𝜌𝑗𝑦𝑖 + 𝑥𝑗𝛽 + 𝜀𝑗                                                                                                (4) 
where the dependent variable in neighbor j influences the dependent variable in neighbor i and vice 
versa.  When the spatial component (whether this component is from the dependent variable, 
control variables or the error term) is statistically significant, the coefficients estimated by non-
spatial model may be biased.  Also, variances may be non-efficient (Griffith, 2005; LeSage and 
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Pace, 2009).  Accordingly, statistical tests (t-test and F-test) may be invalid, leading researchers to 
interpret their results improperly. 
After examining spatial dependency of our dependent variable with a Moran’s I test1 
(Moran’s i index = 0.113, P-value = 0.030), this result show spatial dependency and the need to 
apply spatial econometrics modeling.  There are five different spatial models. The first is the 
spatial autoregressive lag model (SAR) as shown in equations 3 and 4. Spatial Error Model (SEM) 
assumes dependency in error term.  A SLX model or spatial lag of explanatory variable assumes 
that only explanatory variables play a direct role in determining dependent variables.  Lastly, the 
Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) and Spatial Error Durbin Model (SDEM) include spatial lags of the 
explanatory variables as well as the dependent variable and a spatial lag of the explanatory 
variables (WX) along with spatially dependent disturbances.  
To observe dependence between neighboring municipal water utility observations, spatial 
econometrics models differentiate between direct and indirect effects.  Direct effects show how 
changes in an explanatory variable for the ith utility influences the ith utility’s dependent variable.  
Indirect effects illustrate the effects of an explanatory variable in jth utility on ith utility’s dependent 
variable2.  LeSage (2008) argues that since the impacts of the explanatory variable are different 
among observations, it is desirable to have a measurement of overall and average impacts.  He 
introduces the concepts of average direct, indirect, total effects, and also feedback effects.  LeSage 
and Pace (2014) explain “Feedback effects arise when changes to own region/entity characteristics 
exert an impact on outcomes in the own and neighboring regions/entities, which produce additional 
changes or feedback effects on outcomes in the own region.”   
                                                 
1 For more information, please see Li et al. (2007). 
2 For more information, see LeSage and Pace (2014) and LeSage (2008).  
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Parameters in a general linear regression interpret as partial derivative of the dependent 
variable respect to the explanatory variable.  Independent assumption is the base for the estimation 
of partial derivatives in a linear regression.  
In a spatial model, interpretation of the parameters become more complicated.  LeSage and 
Pace, 2009; Anselin and LeGallo, 2006; Kelejian, Tavlas and Hondronyiannis, 2006; Kim, Phipps, 
and Anselin, 2003; LeGallo, Ertur, and Baumont, 2003 argue that the model with a spatial lag of 
the dependent variable require special interpretation of the parameters.  
Elhorst (2014) calculated the direct, indirect and the total effect in a general nesting spatial 
(GNS) model as  
               𝑌 = (𝐼 − 𝛿𝑊)−1(𝑋𝛽 + 𝑊𝑋𝜃) + 𝑅                                                                   (5) 
where R is a rest term containing the intercept and the error terms. 
The matrix of partial derivatives of expected dependent variable with respect to explanatory 
variables can be seen as  
 
[
𝜕𝐸(𝑌)
𝜕𝑥1𝑘
 .  
𝜕𝐸(𝑌)
𝜕𝑥𝑁𝑘
] =  [
𝜕𝐸(𝑦1)
𝜕𝑥1𝑘
.
𝜕𝐸(𝑦1)
𝜕𝑥𝑁𝑘
. . .
𝜕𝐸(𝑦𝑁)
𝜕𝑥1𝑘
.
𝜕𝐸(𝑦𝑁)
𝜕𝑥𝑁𝑘
]                                                                             (6) 
  
= (1 − 𝛿𝑊)−1 [
𝛽𝑘 𝑤12𝜃𝑘 . 𝑤1𝑁𝜃𝑘
𝑤21𝜃𝑘 𝛽𝑘 . 𝑤2𝑁𝜃𝑘
. . . .
𝑤𝑁1𝜃𝑘 𝑤𝑁2𝜃𝑘 . 𝛽𝑘
  ] 
 
 
where 𝑤𝑖𝑗 is the (i, j)th element of W.  Every diagonal element of the partial derivative matrix 
shows the direct effect while the indirect effects show by every off-diagonal element.  Since the 
direct and indirect effects are unique for each observation, Lesage and Pace (2009) propose to 
report the summary indicators (the average of the diagonal elements for the direct effect and the 
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average of either the row sums or the column sums of the off-diagonal elements for indirect 
effects).  𝜃 in a SAR model is equal to zero, indirect effect would be equal to the off-diagonal 
elements of (1 − 𝛿𝑊)−1 𝛽𝑘. 
All spatial models have a weight matrix (W), which quantifies the connections between 
regions.  Elhorst (2014) names the weight matrix as a tool to describe the spatial arrangement of 
the geographical units in the sample.  There are variety of units of measurement for spatial 
dependency such as neighbors, distance, and links (Getis, 2007). The spatial weight matrix is based 
on the distance between municipalities.  In this study, we applied seven nearest-neighbors weight 
matrix.3 Spatial econometric models are estimated using software codes provided by Donald 
Lacombe.4   
For the minimum monthly access charge model, we include variables reflecting cost, social 
equity, municipal governance, city size, and fixed cost considerations.  Brown (2007) explains that 
minimum charges are established to provide an essentially guaranteed base revenue stream for the 
utility.  Kanakoudis and Tsitsifli (2014) argue that the determination of the fixed charge has to be 
based on the actual water charge.  Besides water charge, we introduce social demographics of a 
municipality such as percentage of elderly population, median household income, and percentage 
of population below the poverty level to the minimum charge equation to see whether these 
socioeconomic characteristics influence the minimum monthly charge for access to water 
provision.  
The general form for a minimum access charge equation for water provision is:  
𝑀𝑀𝐶𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑊𝐶𝑖, 𝑆𝐸𝑖 ,  𝑆𝑀𝑖 , 𝐶𝑆𝑖, 𝑊𝐿𝑖)                                                                   (7) 
                                                 
3 Lesage and Pace (2010) argue that the configuration of the spatial weight matrix matters very little 
4 Available at: http://myweb.ttu.edu/dolacomb/matlab.html 
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where (MMC) stands for the minimum monthly charge set by the municipal water utility i, (WC) is 
the water charge, and (SE) shows the socioeconomic factors as indicators of social equity concerns 
influencing minimum charges.  
SM is a dummy variable to describe municipality governance.  This variable is included in 
the minimum monthly access charge model to examine whether local politics influenced this 
charge.  A “strong” mayor-council type of government is compared to a “weak” mayor-council 
and council-manager.  Under a “strong” mayor-council government, a mayor is elected separately 
and has substantial administrative and budgetary authority above the council (National League of 
Cities, 2013).  It is hypothesized that a “strong” mayor type of government would result in more 
political pressure to keep minimum charges low relative to a “weak” mayor or council-manager.  
There is some evidence in the literature that the existence of a “strong” mayor inhibits the 
implementation of policies such as market-based ideas within municipalities (Krebs and Pelissero, 
2010, Bae et al., 2013).  
The CS variable measures the effect of city size on minimum monthly water charge. As we 
explained earlier, minimum charge represents a fixed proportion of the water charge that each 
residential customer must pay regardless of their water consumption.  Since West Virginia is a 
small, mostly rural state, there are few large cities (only one over 50,000 in population).  Thus, the 
size variable utilized was a distinction between class II municipalities (10,000 to 50,000 in 
population) versus class III and IV municipalities (less than 10,000).  The logic for this variable is 
that larger municipalities imply a greater tax base from which there may be an increased ability of 
the municipality to absorb losses that might be incurred from lower minimum monthly access 
charges.  Lastly, we include a variable to measure water loss (WL).  The WL variable examines 
whether fixed costs like water losses influence the minimum water charge.  
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The empirical model for minimum monthly access charges is: 
𝑀𝑀𝐶𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑊𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝐶𝐼𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐻𝑂𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖     (8) 
where (PCI) is average per capita income; (SR) is the percentage of households with one or more 
above 65-year-old; and (HO) is the percentage of households own a house unit.  To avoid a 
simultaneity issue, predicted water charges from equation 2 are utilized for MC since both water 
charges and minimum charges are proposed simultaneously by water utilities to the WV PSC.   
Since education, percent below poverty, and income variables are highly correlated, we 
conducted robustness checks by examining different combinations of these variables in models.  
We examine four different regression models and based on adjusted R2, AIC, SIC, and Hannan-
Quinn criteria, the best model specification is chosen.   
DATA 
Data for this research are primarily based on the annual reports submitted to the WV PSC 
by municipal water utilities in West Virginia.  These annual reports for water utilities are available 
through WV PSC website5 and data were collected for 2014.  These reports contained numerous 
missing values – mostly for total treatment capacity, total main line, total long term debt, and water 
source.  According to the WV PSC, there is no obligation for utilities to provide the information in 
their annual report.  Thus, additional information was gathered through email and phone calls to 
utility personnel about missing data or when information in a report seems questionable.  
Although regulated by the West Virginia Bureau of Public Health (WVBPH), the quality of 
water provided by each municipal utility differs depending upon the number of violations to 
drinking water standards.  We introduce two variables to reflect violations during 2014 obtained 
                                                 
5 Available at: http://www.psc.state.wv.us/Annual_Reports/default.htm 
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from an annual report of environmental engineering division of the WVBPH:  1) the number of 
violations reported for each water utility, and 2) a dummy variable as an indicator of having a 
water violation or not. Out of 125 observations, 72 municipalities did not have any reported 
violations in 2014.  The Natural Resource Analysis Center at West Virginia University provided 
the necessary topography data within municipality boundaries, maximum elevation, minimum 
elevation, elevation difference, and the average slope.  Municipal population size is derived from 
the 2014 population estimates of the U.S. Census Bureau (2015).  
A total of 14 cities in West Virginia have a population greater than 10,000, nine of these 
municipalities are in our data base.  For local governance, historically, most municipalities in West 
Virginia have implemented a mayor-council type of government (Brisbin et al., 1996).  This type 
of government was selected as the base and compared to a strong mayor type.  Municipalities with 
a strong mayor were determined from an on-line search of municipal government web pages and a 
description of their governing structure. Of the 125 municipalities in the database, only nine have a 
strong mayor type. 
Tables 2 and 3 show the data summary statistics6 and expected coefficient signs for the 
independent variables in the water charge and the minimum monthly access charge models.  Due 
to considerations of economies of size and scale, negative coefficients are expected for population 
density, water sold, and the water sold per customer.  We expect a positive coefficient for main line 
length due to added infrastructure costs.  Since ground water typically requires less treatment than 
surface water, we expect a negative coefficient for the ground water source variable.  Also, the 
                                                 
6 For the log-log models, a value of 0.1 is used to replace zeros in all variable observations of zero with the exception of the violations 
variable. This allowed for conversion of variables to log values at a small value close to zero. Since the violations variable is 
expressed as integers only, we added +1 to the current values.  
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violation coefficient is expected to be negative as the number of violations stem from lower quality 
source water and less treatment.  To control for the degree of elevation changes within the utility 
service area, we introduce two topographic variables: difference between maximum and minimum 
elevation and average percent slope (Reznik et al. 2016).  We expect both to have negative 
coefficients – the more changes in topography, the higher the cost of providing water due to higher 
costs of water transmission.  In addition, we tried to control for other explanatory variables such as 
coal production, distance from the river, possibility to have access to private well, and water utility 
age.  None of these variables had a statistically significant coefficient when included in 
regressions, therefore we report these results in Appendices III-IV.     
For the minimum monthly access charge equation, we expect a positive sign for water 
charge.  If social equity matters in setting minimum water charges, then income, education, and 
home ownership variables are expected to have positive coefficients.  Also with social equity 
concerns, the percent of residents who are below the poverty line and the percentage of elderly 
households both should have negative impacts on minimum charges. 
Table 2. Summary statistics of variables used in the water charge model (n=125) 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Expected 
sign of 
coefficient 
Water charges ($) 38.71 11.88 13.26 71.89  
Network length (miles/customer) 0.04 0.27 0.001 3.10 + 
Sold water (million gallons) 137.34 295.26 13 11,374 - 
Sold water per customer (million 
gallons) 
0.06 0.08 0.002 0.83 - 
Debt ($1,000/customer) 1.52 1.42 0 6.03 + 
Water loss (%) 24.59 17.23 0 92.32 + 
Ground water as source  0.26 N/A 0 1.00 - 
Population density (person/sq. 
mile) 
1,316.60 786.37 125.94 5,778.89 - 
Violations (number in 2014) 2.46 5.15 0 34 - 
Elevation difference (ft.) 452.92 234.11 71.99 1285.03 + 
Average slope (%)  18.834 11.175 4.62 55.82 + 
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Table 3. Summary statistics of variables used in the minimum monthly access charge model 
(n=125) 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Expected 
sign of 
coefficient 
Minimum monthly charge ($) 20.99 7.11 3.87 39  
% HHs with 1 and >1 older than 
65 (%) 
31.32 7.99 10.34 49.53 - 
Percentage of population older 
than 65 (%) 
17.62 5.82 4.60 37.50 - 
Median Income ($) 34,892.09 12,263.78 12,344 106,250 + 
Per capita Income ($) 19,719.85 6,473.85 4,472 64,099 + 
Percentage below poverty rate 
(%) 
22.61 9.96 0.1 55.3 - 
Percentage of home ownership 
(%) 
67.44 12.96 29.90 92.70 + 
Percentage of bachelor degree or 
higher (%) 
14.64 10.32 0.1 65.80 + 
Class II municipalities 0.06 N/A 0 1 - 
Strong Mayor 0.04 N/A 0 1 - 
Water loss (%) 24.59 17.23 0 92.32 + 
 
RESULTS 
We estimate regressions using WC and MMC as dependent variables with institutional, 
governmental, geographical, environmental, and socioeconomic factors serving as independent 
variables.  Variables that are highly correlated with the number of customers (network length, sold 
water, debt) are converted to per capita to avoid multicollinearity.  For the water charges model, all 
specification criteria (adjusted R2, AIC, SIC, and Hannan-Quinn criteria) show models with 
Violations and Elevation difference variables as the best for both linear and log-log specifications.  
The Davidson-MacKinnon J test resulted in selection of a linear specification with variables not 
transformed into log values7.   
                                                 
7 The estimated coefficient for predicted value from the log-log model in the linear model is 0.10 (p-value = 0.717) while the estimated 
coefficient for the predicted value from the linear model in the log-log model is 1.04 (p-value = 0.000).     
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For the spatial model, we choose the most representative weight matrix for the data by 
testing for different sets of nearest neighbor relationships.  The seven nearest neighbors’ weight 
matrix has the highest log likelihood value among the eight matrices examined.  Since log-
likelihood has the power to compare the models, this statistic guides us to our particular 
specification (Kalenkoski and Lacombe, 2013).   
To examine spatial correlation among observations, we utilize five different spatial models 
(i.e. SAR, SEM, SDM, SDEM, and SLX).  Table 4 shows the results for the SAR model since this 
model is the only one with a significant spatial component.  We report the other specifications in 
Appendix I.  Model 1 specification is used in a spatial framework because among all the linear and 
log-log functional forms, this model has the highest adjusted R2.  In the SAR model, there is a 
positive and statistically significant spillover effect.  This result means that water charges in 
neighboring municipal utilities have positive spillover effects on the water charge of a particular 
municipal utility. In other words, since water charges are spatially dependent, if charges increase in 
a neighboring municipal j, then water charges in municipal i will increase as well.  
With a statistically significant ρ value in the SAR model, the OLS coefficient estimates are 
likely biased and presented in Table 4 only for a comparison with the magnitude of the direct 
effects from the SAR model.  The water charges model has direct effect with p-values below 0.05 
for the variables: sold water per capita; total debt; ground water as a water source, and population 
density.  The network length variable has a direct effect with a p-value under 0.10, while water 
loss, elevation difference and violation variable coefficients have p-values much above 0.05 (Table 
4).  Our expectations for the elevation difference and violation variables are not met by this model, 
however, their p-values are all above 0.10.  
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To interpret the direct effect results, a one person increase per square mile will decrease the 
water charge by $0.01.  Although based on the quadratic form of population density, this is true up 
to a certain point (5000 people/square mile), after this point, population density will actually start 
to increase water charges.  Other interpretations of 4,500 gallon charges include: increasing the 
total long-term debt by one thousand dollars per customer will increase this charge by $1.84, use of 
ground water as a primary water source reduces this charge by $4.83, and an increase of one mile 
in main line length per customer will increase this charge by $5.15.  
While none of the indirect effects have p-values even close to 0.10, the total effect impacts 
in the SAR model increase the overall magnitude of impact on water charges.  For example, 
ground water as a water source has an estimated total impact of reducing water charges by $6.45 in 
the SAR model compared to the linear model estimate of $5.11.  
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Table 4. Water charges model results for OLS and SAR estimations (n=125) 
 OLS SAR 
Variable Coefficients Direct effect Indirect effect Total effect 
Network length pc 
5.20 
(0.096) 
5.15 
(0.087) 
1.87 
(0.442) 
7.03 
(0.131) 
Sold water (000) 
-8.82 
(0.282) 
-8.33 
(0.285) 
-2.15 
(0.544) 
-10.48 
(0.315) 
Sold water2 (000) 
0.0007 
(0.859) 
0.0004 
(0.915) 
0.00007 
(0.992) 
0.0005 
(0.936) 
Sold water pc 
-126.40 
(0.006) 
-125.33 
(0.004) 
-44.37 
(0.368) 
-169.71 
(0.026) 
Sold water pc2 
147.79 
(0.006) 
146.86 
(0.004) 
51.88 
(0.366) 
198.75 
(0.025) 
Debt pc 
1.84 
(0.002) 
1.84 
(0.001) 
0.65 
(0.347) 
2.50 
(0.015) 
Water loss 
0.05 
(0.281) 
0.05 
(0.234) 
0.02 
(0.511) 
0.07 
(0.273) 
Ground water 
-5.11 
(0.008) 
-4.83 
(0.008) 
-1.61 
(0.339) 
-6.45 
(0.020) 
Population density (000) 
-10.01 
(0.000) 
-9.87 
(0.000) 
-2.59 
(0.336) 
-12.46 
(0.009) 
Population density2 (000) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.0004 
(0.346) 
0.0022 
(0.015) 
Violation 
0.17 
(0.323) 
0.15 
(0.346) 
0.04 
(0.590) 
0.20 
(0.378) 
Elevation difference 
-0.006 
(0.110) 
-0.005 
(0.126) 
-0.001 
(0.432) 
-0.007 
(0.157) 
Constant 
55.54 
(0.000) 
- - 45.45 
(0.000) 
 Adj. R2 = 0.32 
F 12,112 = 5.91 
 
 
Adj. R2 = 0.34 
 
   ρ = 0.23 
p-value = 0.001 
 
Note:  P-values in parenthesis 
pc = per customer 
 
Finally, the best model specified for minimum monthly access charges includes 
variables for households with one or more residents over 65 and per capita income (Table 5).  This 
model also is examined for spatial impacts.  We repeat the same procedure as the water charge 
model in order to choose the most appropriate weight matrix.  The seventh nearest neighbor weight 
matrix has the highest log-likelihood, so that we continue the rest of spatial econometric 
estimations based upon influences from the seventh nearest neighbors.  The results of the SAR and 
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SEM estimations (the only two spatial models with statistically significant spatial components) are 
presented in Table 5.  The results for the other three spatial models are presented in Appendix II.   
Interpreting the spatial model impacts, only predicted water charges impact minimum 
monthly access charges with p-values below 0.05.  These minimum monthly access charges 
incorporate from between 33% and 40% of the municipal utility’s 4,500-gallon charge.  All other 
variables, including the socioeconomic variables, have impacts with p-values well above 0.10.  
Overall, the results of these models show that socioeconomic factors within municipal populations 
do not contribute to equity considerations explaining variations in municipal utility minimum 
charges.  
Water charges have positive indirect effects on the minimum monthly access charges so 
that predicted water charges in municipal i influence not only the minimum water charge in 
municipal i, but also influence the minimum water charge in neighboring j municipalities.  This 
spillover effect from water charges is about 1/3 the size of the direct effect.  Also, the SEM model 
result shows that there are some significant spillover effects of variables that are not explicitly 
modeled (error term).  Except for the negative total effect by strong mayor in the SAR model, none 
of the variable coefficients other than predicted water charge in Table 5 show evidence of 
statistical significance.  
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Table 5. Minimum monthly access charge model results for OLS, SAR, and SEM estimates 
(n=125) 
 OLS SAR SEM 
Variable Coefficients Direct effect Indirect effect Total effect Coefficients 
Predicted Water 
Charge 
0.39 
(0.000) 
0.33 
(0.000) 
0.11 
(0.077) 
0.44 
(0.000) 
0.39 
(0.000) 
Household with one 
or more older than 
65 
0.04 
(0.638) 
0.03 
(0.524) 
0.01 
(0.589) 
0.04 
(0.534) 
0.04 
(0.649) 
Per capita income 
-0.04 
(0.658) 
-0.04 
(0.710) 
-0.02 
(0.759) 
-0.06 
(0.720) 
-0.028 
(0.746) 
Home ownership 
rate 
0.06 
(0.264) 
0.04 
(0.238) 
0.01 
(0.368) 
0.05 
(0.259) 
0.06 
(0.230) 
Class II 
municipalities 
-1.20 
(0.645) 
-1.68 
(0.647) 
-0.68 
(0.708) 
-2.37 
(0.659) 
-0.38 
(0.824) 
Strong Mayor 
-4.55 
(0.095) 
-4.62 
(0.118) 
-1.70 
(0.276) 
-6.33 
(0.099) 
-4.04 
(0.115) 
Water loss 
0.01 
(0.100) 
0.006 
(0.855) 
0.001 
(0.898) 
0.007 
(0.864) 
0.001 
(0.959) 
Constant 
1.02 
(0.823) 
- - 
-5.25 
(0.31) 
1.51 
(0.736) 
 Adj. R2= 0.19 
F 7,117 = 5.19 
 
Adj. R2 = 0.20 
 
Adj. R2 = 0.23 
 ρ = 0.34 
p-value = 0.007 
λ = 0.31 
p-value = 0.022 
Note:  P-values in parenthesis 
CONCLUSIONS 
Previous studies on water cost estimation have neglected both geography and spillover 
aspects regarding factors explaining the cost of providing water, although some researchers 
explicitly recommend controlling for these variables (Antonioli and Filippini, 2001).  As discussed 
earlier, the main goal of this study is first to estimate the influences of primary factors on water 
charges and secondly, to estimate the determinants of minimum monthly access charges across 
municipalities in West Virginia.  Our estimation of the water charge model shows that the quantity 
of water sold per customer, population density, ground water as a primary source of water, and 
utility debt source are the most important explanatory factors for residential water charges.  In 
addition, main line length is an influential factor to explaining water charges.  The addition of a 
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geographic variable did not explain variations in water charges and did have its expected impact on 
water charges.   
From our model results, ground water as a water source lowers water charges by about $5 
to $6 per 4,500 gallons (approximately a 15% reduction in customer cost).  This result 
demonstrates the importance of protecting ground water quality with source water protection 
programs.  According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, states, local governments, and 
utilities all play important roles in water protection programs.  In West Virginia, implementation of 
wellhead protection programs began in the early 1990’s as a part of ground water protection 
strategy to encourage utilities to develop protection and management plans.  The WVBPH assesses 
all of West Virginia’s public water systems and creates polices to provide clean and safe drinking 
water.  Our water charge model results provide the basis for a rough estimate of the benefits from 
this ground water protection.  Allowing for a $5 saving for each 4,500 gallons of use, the over 
240,000 households in West Virginia served by municipalities using ground water have an annual 
cost savings of $3.6 million in their water charges compared to other water sources.     
Similar to Bae (2007), we find that utility debt also impacts water charges.  For every 
$1,000 of utility debt, water charges increase by about $2 per 4,500 gallons.  Given the mean of 
debt per customer and 4,500 gal of water use monthly, utility debt adds about $36 to the annual 
household water bill (about an 8% increase).  This result demonstrates the importance of grant 
versus loan financing to utilities.  As reported by the Environmental Finance System8, different 
organizations provide long term fixed low-interest loans to rural areas and low-income 
communities to help them to increase the water quality.  Prior to the 1987 amendments to the 
Clean Water Act, municipal utility assistance was provided through grants with the federal 
                                                 
8 http://efcnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/WV-Water-Wastewater-Funds-2016.pdf 
31 
 
government picking up 55% of project cost.  This amendment changed grants to low-interest rate 
loans.  This change means that now local governments are responsible for 100% of projects’ cost 
(Copeland, 1999).  This societal change of replacing the federal government grants to municipal 
utilities with low-interest loans has increased long term utility debt, which has increased water 
charges to customers.  
The population density variable has a negative effect on water charges in all model 
specifications, which means more dense areas have lower water charges.  Given the quadratic 
specification, this negative impact occurs only up to a certain point (5,000 people/square mile).  
This is also true for the total water sold to customers.  In other words, although municipalities in 
West Virginia are small, both size and scale impacts are still found in small municipalities.   
In addition, there are modest, but statistically significant (evaluated at a p=0.05 or lower) 
levels of spatial autocorrelation in both models among West Virginia municipal water utilities in 
terms of water charges and minimum monthly access charges.  This result shows that both these 
pricing decisions are influenced by neighboring utilities.  While none of the variables in the water 
charges model had statistically influential, indirect impacts, water charges in the minimum monthly 
access charge model had a positive indirect impact with a p-value below 0.10. Thus, an increase in 
water charges in municipal utility i leads not only to a higher minimum charge in municipality i, 
but also higher minimum charges in neighboring j municipalities due to positive spillover effects.     
When examining minimum charges, there is some evidence that utilities located in strong 
mayor governing system assess lower minimum charges than other municipalities.  Overall, 
minimum charges are closely related to water charges – incorporating just over one-third of the 
water charge for 4,500 gallons into the minimum charge.  To examine the share of household 
income taken up by water charges in West Virginia municipalities, we calculated the average water 
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use for each household multiplied the water charge and divided by the average household income.  
On average, West Virginia households pay far below the OECD standard of 3% to 5% of 
household income for water.  Our results indicate that the average share of water costs across West 
Virginia households with municipal water utilities is about 1.5% of household income devoted to 
water charges with a maximum share being 4%.  With such reasonable costs of water for 
households, this could be a factor explaining why our models find no significant effects from 
socioeconomic factors on monthly minimum charges for access to water.   
Finally, this research raises few issues with affordability of current municipal water 
charges.  However, Mack and Wrase (2017) project affordability issues that could occur with 
future water rate increases of 6% and 41%.  These projected increases are based upon observed 
water rate increases since 2010.  If such water rate increases do occur, this will leave the state of 
West Virginia with the highest percentage of at-risk census tracts (46%) of any state in the nation 
for households unable to afford water bills, primarily due to the prevalence of low-income and 
elderly households in southern and central parts of the state.  Their research raises potential future 
concerns about the continued affordability of water and the financial viability of municipal utilities 
providing service to areas with numerous low income households. 
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Appendix I. 
Table 6. Estimation results for water charges SEM, SDM, SLX, and SDEM models 
Variable SEM  SDM SLX SDEM 
Network length pc 
5.34 
(0.064) 
4.64 
(0.000) 
4.64 
(0.161) 
4.7 
0.10 
Sold water (000) 
-6.86 
(0.219) 
-6.96 
(0.325) 
-6.92 
(0.451) 
-6.78 
(0.395) 
Sold water square (000) 
0.0006 
(0.843) 
-0.0006 
(0.863) 
-0.0006 
(0.889) 
-0.0007 
(0.852) 
Sold water pc 
-123.33 
(0.000) 
-157.10 
(0.000) 
-156.98 
(0.001) 
-157.57 
(0.000) 
Sold water pc square 
145.40 
(0.000) 
187.19 
(0.000) 
178.11 
(0.002) 
178.11 
(0.000) 
Debt pc 
1.81 
(0.001) 
2.01 
(0.000) 
2.01 
(0.002) 
2.00 
(0.000) 
Water loss 
0.08 
(0.222) 
-0.03 
(0.398) 
0.04 
(0.478) 
0.03 
(0.424) 
Ground water 
-5.13 
(0.005) 
-5.004 
(0.004) 
-5.005 
(0.022) 
-4.96 
(0.009) 
Population density (000) 
-9.15 
(0.000) 
-9.15 
(0.000) 
-9.16 
(0.001) 
-9.18 
(0.000) 
Population density square (000) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.016 
(0.009) 
0.016 
(0.002) 
Violation 
0.14 
(0.357) 
0.09 
(0.554) 
0.09 
(0.607) 
0.095 
(0.563) 
Elevation difference 
-0.005 
(0.136) 
-0.004 
(0.311) 
-0.004 
(0.381) 
-0.004 
(0.328) 
Constant 
54.70 
(0.000) 
70.94 
(0.000) 
70.54 
(0.000) 
71.00 
(0.000) 
rho 
- 0.005 
(0.962) 
- - 
Lambda 
0.18 
(0.221) 
- - 
-0.05 
(0.767) 
W* Network length pc - 
-4.82 
(0.000) 
-4.85 
(0.567) 
-4.47 
(0.529) 
W* Sold water (000) - 
4.08 
(0.856) 
4.6 
(0.882) 
4.92 
(0.823) 
W* Sold water square (000) - 
-0.01 
(0.349) 
-0.01 
(0.445) 
-0.01 
(0.320) 
W* Sold water pc - 
-197.44 
(0.000) 
-196.18 
(0.253) 
-203.04 
(0.000) 
W* Sold water  pc square - 
186.88 
(0.000) 
185.58 
(0.326) 
191.23 
(0.000) 
W* Debt pc - 
1.97 
(0.200) 
1.95 
(0.296) 
2.03 
(0.190) 
W* Water loss - 
-0.07 
(0.536) 
-0.07 
(0.643) 
-0.06 
(0.620) 
W* Ground water - 
0.68 
(0.014) 
0.72 
(0.88) 
-0.36 
(0.927) 
W* Population density (000) - 
-5.57 
(0.274) 
-5.44 
(0.506) 
-5.78 
(0.421) 
W* Population density square 
(000) 
- 
0.001 
(0.453) 
0.01 
(0.553) 
0.001 
(0.472) 
W* Violation - 
0.58 
(0.332) 
0.58 
(0.426) 
0.57 
(0.342) 
W* Elevation difference - 
-0.003 
(0.645) 
-0.003 
(0.765) 
-0.003 
(0.716) 
R- square 0.37 0.44 0.44 0.44 
Number of observations = 125 
     P-values in parenthesis 
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Appendix II. 
Table 7. Estimation results for minimum water charge SEM, SDM, SLX, and SDEM models 
Variable SDM SLX SDEM 
Predicted water charge 
0.36 
(0.000) 
0.37 
(0.000) 
0.36 
(0.000) 
Household with one or more 
older than 65 
0.04 
(0.619) 
0.04 
(0.682) 
0.05 
(0.563) 
Per capita income 
-0.008 
(0.932) 
0.008 
(0.921) 
0.027 
(0.759) 
Home ownership rate 
0.06 
(0.955) 
0.06 
(0.340) 
0.05 
(0.377) 
Class II 
-1.02 
(0.135) 
-1.06 
(0.658) 
-1.20 
(0.609) 
SM 
-4.56 
(0.368) 
-5.01 
(0.073) 
-4.75 
(0.072) 
Water loss 
0.007 
(0.825) 
-0.006 
(0.855) 
-0.007 
(0.823) 
Constant 
8.51 
(0.620) 
9.38 
(0.609) 
8.60 
(0.643) 
Rho 
0.24  
(0.097) 
- - 
Lambda - - 
0.12 
(0.198) 
W* Predicted water charge 
-0.04 
(0.718) 
0.06 
(0.952) 
0.07 
(0.897) 
W* Household with one or 
more older than 65 
-0.04 
(0.760) 
-0.23 
(0.860) 
-0.01 
(0.888) 
W* Per capita income 
-0.03 
(0.750) 
-0.04 
(0.725) 
-0.04 
(0.720) 
W* Home ownership rate 
-0.01 
(0.627) 
-0.01 
(0.603) 
-0.01 
(0.615) 
W* Class II 
-10.29 
(0.112) 
-11.40 
(0.095) 
-11.16 
(0.112) 
W* SM 
-2.27 
(0.639) 
-4.77 
(0.454) 
-6.52 
(0.374) 
W*water loss 
0.064 
(0.408) 
0.07 
(0.365) 
0.06 
(0.435) 
R- square 0.28 0.28 0.29 
Number of observations = 125 
      P-values in parenthesis 
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Appendix III. 
         Table 8. Estimation results for water charge spatial model with the coal production variable  
 SAR 
 Direct effect Indirect effect Total effect 
Network length pc 
5.22 
(0.061) 
1.73 
(0.412) 
6.95 
(0.094) 
Sold water (000) 
-9.73 
(0.220) 
-3.09 
(0.522) 
-12.83 
(0.261) 
Sold water2 (000) 
0.001 
(0.738) 
0.0003 
(0.866) 
0.001 
(0.766) 
Sold water pc 
-130.31 
(0.003) 
-43.45 
(0.361) 
-173.77 
(0.020) 
Sold water pc2 
153.742 
(0.003) 
51.27 
(0.362) 
205.02 
(0.020) 
Debt pc 
1.79 
(0.001) 
0.59 
(0.333) 
2.39 
(0.012) 
Water loss 
0.06 
(0.190) 
0.02 
(0.484) 
0.08 
(0.229) 
Ground water 
-5.12 
(0.006) 
-1.60 
(0.317) 
-6.72 
(0.014) 
Population density (000) 
-9.57 
(0.000) 
-3.18 
(0.327) 
-12.76 
(0.008) 
Population density2 (000) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.0005 
(0.330) 
0.002 
(0.013) 
Violation 
0.13 
(0.398) 
0.04 
(0.624) 
0.17 
(0.424) 
Elevation difference 
-0.003 
(0.373) 
-0.001 
(0.557) 
-0.005 
(0.391) 
Coal production 
-0.000 
(0.352) 
-0.000 
(0.632) 
-0.000 
(0.390) 
Constant 
45.807 
(0.000) 
Adjusted R- square 0.336 
Rho 
0.22 
(0.000) 
P-values in parenthesis 
Note: In this model, we control for the cumulative coal production to see if there is any impact for 
the municipalities that are located in counties with surface and underground coal production.  As 
the Appendix III shows coal production is not an influential factor to determine the water charge in 
municipalities.  
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Appendix IV. 
Table 9. Estimation results for water charge spatial model with the distance from the river 
variable 
 SAR 
 Direct effect Indirect effect Total effect 
Network length pc 
5.43 
(0.063) 
1.96 
(0.278) 
7.40 
(0.081) 
Sold water (000) 
-8.65 
(0.252) 
-3.00 
(0.423) 
-11.65 
(0.271) 
Sold water2 (000) 
0.0005 
(0.884) 
0.0001 
(0.928) 
0.0006 
(0.894) 
Sold water pc 
-127.09 
(0.002) 
-45.24 
(0.184) 
-172.33 
(0.007) 
Sold water pc2 
149.008 
(0.002) 
52.95 
(0.182) 
201.96 
(0.007) 
Debt pc 
1.79 
(0.002) 
0.63 
(0.189) 
2.43 
(0.007) 
Water loss 
0.05 
(0.310) 
0.01 
(0.468) 
0.06 
(0.328) 
Ground water 
-4.66 
(0.014) 
-1.61 
(0.186) 
-6.28 
(0.019) 
Population density (000) 
-9.72 
(0.000) 
-3.47 
(0.174) 
-13.20 
(0.003) 
Population density2 (000) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.0006 
(0.190) 
0.002 
(0.009) 
Violation 
0.16 
(0.305) 
0.05 
(0.443) 
0.22 
(0.316) 
Elevation difference 
-0.006 
(0.097) 
-0.002 
(0.301) 
-0.008 
(0.115) 
Distance from the river 
-0.000 
(0.586) 
-0.000 
(0.656) 
-0.0001 
(0.591) 
Constant 
45.600 
(0.000) 
Adjusted R- square 0.334 
Rho 
0.24 
(0.056) 
P-values in parenthesis 
Note: Distance to a river may influence the water charge.  We expect to see municipalities that are 
closer to a river provide the water with a lower charge.  To test for this hypothesis, we introduce a 
new variable that measure the distance from main rivers in West Virginia: North Branch Potomac 
River, Greenbrier River, Ohio River, Tug Fork, Hughes River, Monongahela River, Shavers Fork, 
Cheat River, Shenandoah River, Kanawha River, South Branch Potomac River, Tygart Valley 
River, New River, Cacapon River, Little Kanawha River, West Fork River, Guyandotte River, 
Twelvepole Creek, Back Creek, Elk River, Bluestone River, and Bukhannon River.  The distance 
from a nearest river for the water utility is not an influential factor to determine the water charge.  
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Appendix V. 
         Table 10. Estimation results for water charge spatial model with the possibility to have a 
private water well variable  
 SAR 
 Direct effect Indirect effect Total effect 
Network length pc 
5.21 
(0.079) 
1.85 
(0.349) 
7.06 
(0.108) 
Sold water (000) 
-8.46 
(0.279) 
-2.86 
(0.451) 
-11.32 
(0.294) 
Sold water2 (000) 
0.0007 
(0.850) 
0.0002 
(0.895) 
0.0009 
(0.858) 
Sold water pc 
-126.81 
(0.003) 
-44.72 
(0.270) 
-171.53 
(0.016) 
Sold water pc2 
147.88 
(0.003) 
51.89 
(0.269) 
199.78 
(0.016) 
Debt pc 
1.87 
(0.001) 
0.65 
(0.238) 
2.52 
(0.007) 
Water loss 
0.05 
(0.284) 
0.01 
(0.465) 
0.07 
(0.298) 
Ground water 
-4.78 
(0.007) 
-1.61 
(0.240) 
-6.40 
(0.015) 
Population density (000) 
-9.97 
(0.000) 
-3.48 
(0.216) 
-13.45 
(0.003) 
Population density2 (000) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.0005 
(0.229) 
0.002 
(0.007) 
Violation 
0.14 
(0.375) 
0.04 
(0.524) 
0.19 
(0.390) 
Elevation difference 
-0.006 
(0.104) 
-0.002 
(0.323) 
-0.008 
(0.122) 
Well 
-0.88 
(0.665) 
-0.36 
(0.700) 
-1.24 
(0.661) 
Constant 
45.429 
(0.000) 
Adjusted R- square 0.333 
Rho 
0.24 
(0.060) 
P-values in parenthesis 
Note: Some argue having the access to a private water well may increase the water charge for the 
municipality.  Because utility need to provide the drinking water to different locations while by 
having access to the private well, the number of customers may decrease.  We test the hypothesis 
to see if having access to a private well tend to impact water charge in municipalities.  The results 
show although the effects in negative but it is insignificant.  
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Appendix VI. 
         Table 11. Estimation results for water charge spatial model with the water utility age 
variable  
 SAR 
 Direct effect Indirect effect Total effect 
Network length pc 
5.07 
(0.084) 
1.92 
(0.294) 
7.00 
(0.104) 
Sold water (000) 
-8.83 
(0.263) 
-3.30 
(0.429) 
-12.13 
(0.283) 
Sold water2 (000) 
0.0009 
(0.809) 
0.0003 
(0.857) 
0.001 
(0.818) 
Sold water pc 
-120.24 
(0.006) 
-46.03 
(0.212) 
-166.27 
(0.018) 
Sold water pc2 
40.22 
(0.006) 
53.41 
(0.208) 
193.64 
(0.017) 
Debt pc 
1.82 
(0.001) 
0.69 
(0.202) 
2.52 
(0.007) 
Water loss 
0.05 
(0.237) 
0.02 
(0.398) 
0.07 
(0.253) 
Ground water 
-4.56 
(0.011) 
-1.69 
(0.203) 
-6.25 
(0.020) 
Population density (000) 
-10.51 
(0.000) 
-3.98 
(0.168) 
-14.50 
(0.002) 
Population density2 (000) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.0007 
(0.179) 
0.002 
(0.006) 
Violation 
0.14 
(0.378) 
0.05 
(0.525) 
0.19 
(0.396) 
Elevation difference 
-0.005 
(0.117) 
-0.002 
(0.298) 
-0.007 
(0.129) 
Utility age 
-0.081 
(0.287) 
-0.032 
(0.441) 
-0.11 
(0.307) 
Constant 
40.90 
(0.000) 
Adjusted R- square 0.334 
Rho 
0.25 
(0.048) 
P-values in parenthesis 
Note: Age of the facilities in a water utility system may effect water charges.  Most of the 
municipality water utilities start performing in 1960 but there are some that start working earlier or 
later.  We control for the age of the utility and the results are not significant.  
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Figure 1. Map of West Virginia municipal utilities and 
their 2014 water charges 
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CHAPTER 3: THE IMPACTS OF NALOXONE ACCESS LAWS ON 
OPIOID OVERDOSE DEATHS IN THE U.S. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Opioid overdose is the leading cause of unintentional death in the U.S. (Visconti et al., 
2015).  From 2000 to 2014, half a million people in the U.S. died from opioid overdoses, with over 
28,000 dying in 2014 alone.9 Overdose deaths have become such a problem in the U.S. that life 
expectancy has dropped two years in a row (Stobbe, 2017).  When addressing the opioid crisis as a 
public health problem, state level responses can be categorized as either attempts to: (1) limit the 
supply of opioids through prescription drug monitoring programs, or (2) reduce the number of 
overdoses by authorizing the more widespread provision of overdose reversal drugs, such as 
Naloxone (Davis and Chang, 2013a; Davis et al., 2013b; Davis et al., 2014; Beheshti et al., 2015; 
Davis et al., 2017).  Naloxone is a prescription drug that counteracts the effects of an overdose, 
making it an extremely powerful, though complicated, drug in that its provision may create a false 
sense of security among drug users.  
In this research, we estimate the effect that state level Naloxone access laws have on 
overdose deaths using a spatial difference-in-differences framework. Given the vast array of 
literature focusing on opioid overdose death (Visconti et al., 2015; Stobbe, 2017; Scott et al., 2007; 
Rossen et al., 2013), there is a huge gap in coverage of possible spatial dependency in state and/or 
county level data. One can easily hypothesize that Naloxone access laws have spatial spillover 
effects on opioid overdose death rates across states due to factors such as cross-border movement 
                                                 
9 For more information, please refer to Rudd et al. (2016) 
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of Naloxone, prescription and illegal drugs, and physician shopping (see e.g. Buchmueller and 
Carey 2018).  Thus, not accounting for spatial dependency in state level data allows for 
misspecification of the actual impact of these laws on the outcome variable. 
To avoid this misspecification bias, the use of a spatial difference-in-difference analysis 
provides us with estimates of both within state and spillover effects among contiguous states from 
enactment of a Naloxone access law. The extent to which the law expands access to Naloxone 
varies state by state. The spillover analysis allows us to document biases present in the standard, 
non-spatial model. We find that Naloxone access laws (either as a binary variable, the days after 
the law, or when broken down into various provisions10) have positive and significant impacts on 
opioid overdose death rates and mostly these impacts occur within neighboring states.  The impacts 
of a Naloxone access law within the state itself are not significant except for provisions which 
provide immunity for criminal and civil liability for a lay person.  Thus, important state level 
spillover effects exist for Naloxone access laws on opioid overdose death rates.   
Our main contribution to the literature is development of a SDID (Spatial Difference-in- 
Difference) framework to investigate the spillover effects of state level Naloxone access laws on 
overdose death rates in surrounding states.  In addition, we examine the different impacts of 
specific provisions of access law as explained in section 2.  Enactment of Naloxone access laws 
demonstrates suggestive evidence of spatial dependence in that neighboring states begin to adopt 
these laws, especially after 2013.11  To the best of our knowledge, no previous study has controlled 
for the spatial interaction between Naloxone access laws and opioid overdose death rates so that 
the regional aspects of these laws has not been investigated.  
                                                 
10 Provisions are identified later  
11 Available at: http://lawatlas.org/ 
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The rest of the manuscript proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background information 
on trends in opioid overdose and Naloxone access laws. Section 3 provides an empirical model and 
section 4 describes the data.  In section 5, we explain the methods and spatial econometric 
framework utilized, while section 6 reports the results.  We conclude in section 7 with a discussion 
and policy implications. 
Opioid overdose is the leading cause of unintentional death in the U.S. (Visconti et al., 
2015). From 2000 to 2014, half a million people in the U.S. died from opioid overdoses, with over 
28,000 dying in 2014 alone.12 Overdose deaths have become such a problem in the U.S. that life 
expectancy has dropped two years in a row (Stobbe, 2017).  State responses to the opioid crisis can 
be categorized by attempts to limit the supply of opioids through prescription drug monitoring 
programs and attempts to reduce the number of overdoses by authorizing the provision of drugs 
such as Naloxone (Davis and Chang, 2013a; Davis and Burris, 2013b; Davis et al., 2014; Beheshti 
et al., 2015).  Naloxone is a prescription drug that counteracts the effects of an overdose, making it 
an extremely powerful, though complicated, drug in that its provision may create a false sense of 
security among addicts.  
In this research, we estimate the effect of state level Naloxone access laws on overdose 
deaths using a spatial difference-in-differences framework. Given the vast array of literature 
focusing on opioid overdose death (Visconti et al., 2015; Stobbe, 2017; Scott et al., 2007; Rosen et 
al., 2013), there is a huge gap in coverage of possible spatial dependency in state and/or county 
level data. One can easily hypothesize that Naloxone access laws have spatial spillover effects on 
opioid overdose death rates across states due to factors such as cross-border movement of both 
                                                 
12 For more information, please refer to Rudd et al. (2016) 
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Naloxone and opioid drugs.  Thus, not accounting for spatial dependency in state level data allows 
for misspecification of the actual impact of the law on the outcome variable. 
To avoid this misspecification bias, the use of a spatial difference-in-difference analysis 
provides us with estimates of both within state and spillover effects among contiguous states from 
enacting a Naloxone access law.  In terms of the extent to which the law expands the access to 
Naloxone varies state by state.  The spillover analysis allows us to document biases of the standard 
model.  We find Naloxone access law (in general as a binary variable, the days after the law and 
breaking down Naloxone access laws into various provisions), has a mixture of positive and 
significant impacts on opioid overdose death rates occurs, particularly within neighboring states.  
Our results mean that state level adaptation of a Naloxone access law is statistically associated with 
higher opioid overdose deaths in neighboring states, although the impacts within the state itself are 
not significant.  Thus, important spillover effects exist from the various provisions of Naloxone 
access laws on opioid overdose death rates.   
 Our main contribution to the literature is developing a SDID (Spatial Difference in 
Difference) framework to investigate the spillover effects of state level Naloxone access laws on 
overdose death rates in surrounding states.  In addition, we examine the different impacts of 
specific provisions of access law as explained in section 2.  Enactment of Naloxone access laws 
demonstrates suggestive evidence of spatial dependence in that neighboring states begin to adopt 
these laws, especially after 2013.13 To the best of our knowledge, no previous study has controlled 
for the spatial interaction between Naloxone access laws and opioid overdose death rates so that 
the regional aspects of these laws has not been investigated.  
                                                 
13 Available at: http://lawatlas.org/ 
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The rest of the manuscript proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background information 
on trends in opioid overdose and Naloxone access laws.  Section 3 provides an empirical model 
and section four describes the data.  In section five, we explain the methods and spatial 
econometric framework utilized, while section six reports the results and robustness checks.  We 
conclude in section seven with a discussion and policy implications. 
BACKGROUND  
Opioid trends 
Mortality from opioid overdose has more than quadrupled since 1999.14 Figure 2 
compares opioid overdose death rates among states in 1999 and 2016.  Opioid overdose death 
rates increased during this time period in every state.  In 2016, West Virginia had the highest rate 
of overdose death, while Nebraska had the lowest rate. Between 1999 and 2016, increases in 
opioid overdose death rates per 100,000 ranged from 0.69 in Arkansas to 38.17 in West Virginia.  
Overdoses occur when a person takes a lethal or toxic amount of opiates – such as an 
illicit drug (e.g. heroin) or prescription medications (e.g. oxycodone).15  Opiate overdoses can 
lead to depressed or slowed breathing, confusion, and the lack of oxygen to the brain. Overdoses 
potentially can occur with legitimate uses of opiates, such as pain relief from a work-related 
injury.16   
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Available at: https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html 
15 Importantly, many legally prescribed opioids are taken illegally by individuals who were not the original patient.  
16 Available at: https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/prescription/default.html 
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Figure 2. Opioid overdose death per 100,000 population 
by state, 1999 and 2016 
 
Source: CDC-WONDER 
 
In 2015, 2.8 million private industry workers and 752,000 public sector workers suffered 
from nonfatal workplace injuries, many of which led to receiving opioid drug prescriptions and 
thereby leading to potential abuse, addiction, and/or overdose (Salsberg, 2017).  Former Food 
and Drug Administration head David Kessler called the opioid epidemic one of the “great 
mistakes of modern medicine”.17  Workplace injuries served as a driver for prescribing opioids 
that have the potential to transform into addiction and ultimately overdose and even death.  
Reducing opioid abuse and controlling overdose deaths is an important policy goal for 
both state and federal governments.  With a deadlier supply of drugs, controlling the opioid crisis 
became harder and harder over time.18  For many years, opioid overdose prevention programs 
have provided protection services.  Since 1996, an increasing number of community-based 
programs have provided Naloxone (an opioid antagonist) to laypersons to reverse the effects of 
opioid overdose.  Narcan TM (Naloxone) is a prescription medicine, but not a controlled 
                                                 
17 Available at: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/former-fda-head-doctor-david-kessler-opioid-epidemic-one-of-great-mistakes-of-
modern-medicine/ 
18 For more information, please refer to: https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/health/opioids-
scale/?utm_term=.8748581d9268  
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substance that can block the effects of opioids with no life threatening effects on the opiate users. 
19, 20  Naloxone acts on a person’s brain by attaching to the same part of the brain that receives 
the opioid (Open society foundation, 2017).  Once administered, Naloxone takes two to three 
minutes for its effect to be felt.  If an overdose victim does not wake up, a second dose should be 
administered.  
News report examples of Naloxone being used to save lives abound.  For instance, Chad 
Ward, an Emergency Medical Services Supervisor in Huntington, WV, noted that in 2015 there 
were 944 drug overdoses in Cabell County, but having access to Naloxone allowed him to save 
many patients at the scene of the overdose.21  In another more famous example, the musician 
Prince suffered an oxycodone overdose on April 15, 2016. After being given two doses of 
Narcan, he recovered.  However, six days later, he overdosed for the last time on Fentanyl –a 
synthetic opioid 50 times more powerful than heroin.22 
The examples above demonstrate the conflicting viewpoints on Naloxone.  Whether 
Naloxone saves lives or simply delays an eventual overdose death is the paradox at the center of 
whether it is a solution to the overdose epidemic.23,24,25,26.   
With the recent growth in overdose deaths, interest in assessing the effects of Naloxone 
access laws and overdose prevention programs on overdose deaths has increased (e.g. Walley et 
                                                 
19 A controlled substance is generally an opioid or chemical whose manufacture, possession, or use is regulated by a government, 
such as illicitly used opioids or prescription medications. 
20 Available at: http://stopoverdoseil.org/narcan.html 
21 Available at: http://www.wsaz.com/content/news/WSAZ-Investigates-A-Dose-of-Reality-368538771.html 
22 Available at: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/official-pills-found-at-princes-estate-contained-fentanyl/ 
23 Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/09/us/opioids-narcan-drug-overdose-heroin-fentanyl.html?emc=eta1 
24 Available at: http://www.wsaz.com/content/news/WSAZ-Investigates-A-Dose-of-Reality-368538771.html 
25 Available at: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/official-pills-found-at-princes-estate-contained-fentanyl/ 
26 Available at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4675355/pdf/nihms742274.pdf 
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al., 2013; Visconti et al., 2015).  Adoption of Naloxone access laws has been found to be 
associated with a 9 to 11 percent reduction in opioid-related deaths (Rees et al., 2017).  In a 
recent working paper, Doleac and Mukherjee (2018) argue that the positive association between 
Naloxone access laws and opioid-related emergency room visits along with opioid-related theft 
demonstrate a classic moral hazard problem among opioid abusers.  For example, providing 
access to Naloxone may have increased the likelihood individuals took more potent drugs 
(Doleac and Mukherjee 2018).  One reason for an increase in hospitalizations without a change 
in deaths for drug overdoses is that Naloxone allows individuals who otherwise would have died 
to make it to the hospital.  There is a body of literature that show behavioral responses to 
different policies (Chan et al., 2015; Lakdawalla et al., 2006; Cohen and Einav, 2003).  In 
another study, Siegler (2015) found a 16% decrease in overdose deaths in New York City after 
the implementation of an overdose prevention program, but his results were not statistically 
significant for heroin-related overdose mortalities.  Similarly, Rees et al. (2017) find statistically 
insignificant effects of Naloxone access laws on heroin-related deaths in the U.S.   
None of these previous research efforts have accounted for the spatial spillovers of access 
laws between states.  Without accounting for spatial spillovers, the results may be biased due to 
model misspecification.  In other words, by ignoring spatial aspects, only within state effects of 
access laws are examined under the assumptions that both the access law and overdose death rate 
in one state are totally independent of access laws and death rates in neighboring states.  The 
direction of this bias is ambiguous.  
Naloxone Access Laws 
Naloxone has been available by prescription since 1996, although the legal environment 
for prescribing and dispensing Naloxone varies by state.  State legislators have enacted a variety 
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of provisions to expand and to ease prescribing and distributing of Naloxone to prevent 
overdoses.  For example, a number of states have enacted laws that involve less civil and 
criminal liability, whether for prescribers, dispensers or users (Lim et al., 2016).  Davis and Carr 
(2015) argue that “at risk” individuals do not have regular contact with professional care givers 
so that laws and regulations need to ease access to Naloxone beyond traditional prescriptions.  
In a traditional Naloxone prescription setting, prescribers prescribe Naloxone to high risk 
individuals, such as those who take high doses of opioids.  In addition, under this setting, only 
pharmacists or physicians can distribute Naloxone.  Because of the spike in opioid-related 
deaths, lawmakers and researchers have pushed to make Naloxone available for those most likely 
to respond to an overdose.  The first responders include family, friends, harm reduction program 
staff, law enforcement officers, emergency medical technicians, and others (Davis and Carr, 
2015).   
State laws vary in terms of the extent to which they expand the access to Naloxone and/or 
remove the legal liabilities associated with prescribing, dispensing, or distributing Naloxone 
(Davis and Carr, 2017).  In some states, prescriptions of Naloxone can be provided to third 
parties, or individuals likely to witness an overdose while not being personally at risk of 
overdose.  In some states, prescribers, dispensers, and users are immune from criminal and/or 
civil liability when administering Naloxone.  Additional versions of access laws remove criminal 
liability for possession of Naloxone.  Certain states allow prescribing by a standing order, where 
prescribers give the authority to pharmacists and other healthcare providers to dispense Naloxone 
to the person in need (Davis and Carr, 2017; Green et al, 2015).  Within states without an access 
law, Naloxone requires a written prescription by a physician.  In these states, physicians who 
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prescribe and individuals who use Naloxone are not immune from criminal and civil liability and 
professional sanctions.  
The list below provided by the Prescription Drug Abuse Policy System (PDAPS) offers a 
breakdown of Naloxone access law (NAL) provisions into eleven types.27    
Provision 1: Having immunity from criminal prosecution for prescribing, dispensing or 
distributing Naloxone to a layperson for prescribers.  
Provision 2: Having immunity from civil liability for prescribing, dispensing or 
distributing Naloxone to a layperson for prescribers.  
Provision 3: Having immunity from professional sanctions for prescribing, dispensing or 
distributing Naloxone to a layperson for prescribers. 
Provision 4: Having immunity from criminal prosecution for prescribing, dispensing or 
distributing Naloxone to a layperson for dispensers. 
Provision 5: Having immunity from civil liability for prescribing, dispensing or 
distributing Naloxone to a layperson for dispensers. 
Provision 6: Having immunity from professional sanctions for prescribing, dispensing or 
distributing Naloxone to a layperson for dispensers. 
Provision 7: Prescribers are allowed to provide Naloxone to third parties. 
Provision 8: Pharmacists are allowed to dispense or distribute without a patient-specific 
prescription from another medical professional. 
Provision 9: Immunity from criminal liability when administering Naloxone for a  
Layperson. 
Provision 10: Immunity from civil liability when administering Naloxone for a layperson. 
                                                 
27 For more information, please refer to: http://pdaps.org/datasets/laws-regulating-administration-of-naloxone-1501695139 
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Provision 11: Removing criminal liability for possession of Naloxone28 
New Mexico was the first state to amend its laws (in 2001) to make it easier for medical 
professionals to prescribe Naloxone and for lay administrators to use it without fear of legal 
repercussions.  Table 12 shows the effective date of enacted Naloxone laws starting from 2001.  
At the end of 2016 a total of 48 states had adopted Naloxone access laws.  Thirty-nine of these 
states allowed “standing orders” (also called “non-patient-specific prescriptions”)  
As it is shown in Table 13, states tend to implement Naloxone laws by grouping 
provisions together.  For instance, immunity from civil liability for prescribers and dispensers is 
almost always implemented in the same state during the same year.  The exceptions are North 
Carolina and Ohio.  With the exception of Ohio, immunity from criminal liability for prescribers 
and dispensers is implemented in all the states simultaneously.  Immunity from civil and criminal 
liability for the laypersons follows the same trend.  These trends mean that when states 
implement a specific provision for a category of professional healthcare providers, they usually 
implement the same provision for other healthcare providers as well.  As a result of this pattern, 
collinearity issues arise in regression models when including all 11 provisions in an empirical 
model.  Because of this potential collinearity, we group these 11 provisions into five categories 
for our analysis, which we describe in more detail in the next section.   
Numerous studies have analyzed the relationships between Naloxone access laws and 
overdose deaths (Coffin et al., 2003; Seal et al., 2005; Walley et al., 2013; Davis, 2015; Davis 
and Carr, 2015; Rowe et al., 2016; Coffin and Sullivan, 2013; Enteen, et al., 2010; Green, et al., 
2008; Inocencio, et al., 2013; Lim et al., 2016; Wheeler et al., 2015).  These studies generally 
                                                 
28 Removing criminal liability for possession of Naloxone should increase access and encourage its use in emergency situations 
(Davis et al., 2013b). 
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investigate the effectiveness of Naloxone access on overdose deaths in observational settings.  
For instance, according to Wheeler et al. (2015) between 1996 and 2014, community 
organizations provided Naloxone rescue kits to 152,283 laypersons and received reports of 
26,463 overdose reversals. Evidence of Naloxone access laws as a public health response to the 
opioid crisis being an overdose prevention tool on both nationwide and regional scales is still 
mixed.  In this study, we employ state level analyses using the dates of enactment for Naloxone 
access laws to investigate the spillover effects on opioid overdose death rates.  
EMPIRICAL MODEL 
Empirical studies have shown that a number of factors influence opioid overdose deaths 
in the U.S.  Table 14 shows the important variables, study region, their impact on overdose 
deaths, and references.  However, the opioid epidemic literature is lacking investigations that 
include the effects of high-risk injury occupations such as mining, manufacturing and 
constructions, availability of drug prescriptions and heroin related crime (as an indicator for 
availability of heroin) on opioid overdose deaths.   
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Table 12. Effective Dates of Naloxone Access Laws, 1999-2016 
State Naloxone Access Law Effective Date 
Alabama 
Alaska 
Arizona 
Arkansas 
California 
Colorado  
Connecticut  
Washington, D.C.  
Delaware  
Florida 
Georgia  
Hawaii 
Idaho 
Illinois  
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kentucky  
Louisiana 
Maine  
Maryland  
Massachusetts  
Michigan  
Minnesota  
Mississippi 
Missouri 
Nebraska 
Nevada 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey  
New Mexico  
New York  
North Carolina   
North Dakota 
Ohio  
Oklahoma  
Oregon  
Pennsylvania  
Rhode Island  
South Carolina 
South Dakota 
Tennessee  
Texas 
Utah  
Vermont  
Virginia  
Washington  
West Virginia 
Wisconsin  
 
June 10, 2015 
March 15, 2016 
August 6, 2016 
July 15, 2015 
January 1, 2008  
May 10, 2013  
October 1, 2003  
March 19, 2013  
August 4, 2014  
June 10, 2015 
April 24, 2014  
June 6, 2016 
July 1, 2015 
January 1, 2010  
April 17, 2015 
May 27, 2016 
June 25, 2013  
August 15, 2015 
April 29, 2014  
October 1, 2013  
August 2, 2012  
October 14, 2014  
May 10, 2014  
July 1, 2015 
August 28, 2015 
May 28, 2015 
October 1, 2015 
June 2, 2015 
July 1, 2013  
April 3, 2001  
April 1, 2006  
April 9, 2013  
August 1, 2015 
March 11, 2014  
November 1, 2013  
June 6, 2013  
December 1, 2014  
June 18, 2012  
June 3, 2015 
July 1, 2016 
July 1, 2014  
September 1, 2015 
May 13, 2014  
July 1, 2013  
July 1, 2013  
June 10, 2010  
May 27, 2015 
April 9, 2014  
        Source: Prescription Drug Abuse Policy System (PDAPS) 
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Table 13. Effective Dates of Naloxone Access Law Provisions, 1999-201629 
Year PR 1 PR 2 PR 3 PR 4 PR 5 PR 6 PR 7 PR 8 PR 9 PR 10 PR 11 
2001 NM NM  NM NM  NM  NM NM  
2002            
2003 CT CT  CT CT       
2004            
2005            
2006            
2007       NY     
2008 CA CA  CA CA       
2009            
2010   
IL 
WA 
  
IL 
WA 
IL 
WA 
IL 
IL 
WA 
  
2011         CA   
2012 MA      MA  RI RI MA 
2013 
CO 
NJ 
NC 
VT 
CO 
NJ 
NC 
VT 
CO 
KY 
MD 
NJ 
CO 
NJ 
VT 
CO 
NJ 
VT 
CO 
KY 
MD 
NJ 
 
KY 
MD 
NJ 
NC 
OK 
OR 
VT 
VA 
KY 
NJ 
NC 
OR 
VT 
CO 
DC 
KY 
NJ 
NC 
VT 
CO 
DC 
KY 
NJ 
NC 
OR 
VT 
VA 
DC 
VT 
2014 
DE 
GA 
MN 
OH 
PA 
UT 
WI 
DE 
GA 
MI 
MN 
OH 
PA 
TN 
UT 
WI 
CA 
DE 
GA 
OH 
PA 
RI 
TN 
UT 
WI 
DE 
GA 
PA 
UT 
WI 
DE 
GA 
MI 
MN 
PA 
TN 
UT 
WI 
CA 
DE 
GA 
PA 
RI 
TN 
UT 
WI 
CA 
GA 
ME 
MI 
OH 
PA 
RI 
TN 
UT 
WI 
CA 
DE 
GA 
MA 
MN 
NM 
NY 
OK 
PA 
RI 
TN 
WI 
CT 
GA 
MA 
MI 
MN 
NY 
OH 
PA 
WI 
CT 
GA 
MI 
MN 
NY 
PA 
TN 
UT 
WI 
MI 
RI 
WI 
2015 
AL 
AK 
FL 
ID 
IL 
LA 
MS 
NE 
NV 
NH 
ND 
SC 
TX 
WV 
AL 
AK 
FL 
ID 
IN 
LA 
MD 
MS 
MO 
NE 
NH 
ND 
SC 
TX 
VA 
WV 
AK 
FL 
ID 
LA 
MS 
NE 
NV 
NH 
ND 
SC 
TX 
AL 
AK 
FL 
IL 
LA 
MS 
NE 
NE 
NH 
NC 
ND 
SC 
TX 
WA 
WV 
AL 
AK 
FL 
IL 
IN 
LA 
MD 
MS 
NE 
NH 
NC 
ND 
OH 
SC 
TX 
VA 
WA 
WV 
AK 
CT 
FL 
LA 
MS 
NE 
NV 
NH 
ND 
OH 
SC 
TX 
AL 
AK 
CO 
CT 
FL 
ID 
IN 
LA 
MS 
NE 
NV 
NH 
ND 
SC 
TX 
VA 
WV 
AL 
AK 
CO 
CT 
ID 
IN 
LA 
ME 
MD 
MS 
NV 
NH 
ND 
OH 
SC 
TX 
VA 
WA 
WV 
AL 
AK 
ID 
LA 
MS 
NE 
NV 
NH 
ND 
SC 
TX 
AL 
AK 
FL 
ID 
IL 
IN 
LA 
MD 
MS 
NE 
NH 
ND 
SC 
TX 
WA 
WV 
NV 
ND 
TX 
WV 
2016 
AZ 
ME 
MO 
SD 
WA 
 
IA 
ME 
SD 
WA 
AZ 
ME 
MO 
SD 
AZ 
CT 
ME 
MO 
SD 
ME 
MO 
SD 
AZ 
ME 
MO 
NM 
SD 
AZ 
IA 
SD 
AZ 
FL 
IA 
MO 
SD 
ME 
MO 
UT 
WV 
AZ 
IA 
ME 
MA 
MO 
IA 
LA 
MO 
NM 
Source: Prescription Drug Abuse Policy System (PDAPS) 
                                                 
29 Available at: http://pdaps.org/datasets/laws-regulating-administration-of-naloxone-1501695139 
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The difference-in-difference (DID) technique is an econometric tool first applied in the 
19th century to control for before-and-after implementation of a treatment or policy 30(National 
Research Council, 2004).  A standard DID model to evaluate the effects of a Naloxone access 
law by differentiating between treatment and control (untreated) states is represented by:   
            𝑇𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑤𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡                                      (1) 
 
where 𝑇𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the opioid overdose death rate in state i in year t. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of time- 
varying covariates that control for factors influencing death rates such as those listed in Table 14.  
𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑇𝑖𝑡 is the DID variable which takes a value of 1 if the state had a Naloxone access law in 
that particular year and zero otherwise. 31  𝑣𝑖  is an unobservable, time-invariant state effect, 
which subsumes the main effect of the Naloxone law, while 𝑤𝑡 is a vector of year fixed effects 
which subsumes the main effect of the variable T (time). 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is an error term.  
The standard DID model presented in equation (1) raises a possible issue with 
endogeneity for the NAL variable, i.e. does the level of a state’s opioid overdose death rate 
influence enactment of a Naloxone access law in that state?  We tested for this by examining 
state overdose death rates in the year prior to enactment of an access law compared to rates in 
states without an access law.  To account for different years of means, we subtracted the state 
means from the national mean in that year (for non-access law states, 2014 overdose death rates 
are used).  A t-test showed no statistical difference between access law and no access law states 
(t = -0.611, p =0.544).  Based upon this evidence, endogeneity in equation (1) is not seen as an 
issue. 
                                                 
30 More information is available at: https://www.mailman.columbia.edu/research/population-health-methods/difference-difference-
estimation 
31 In Rees et al. (2017), those states that the law was in effect for less than a full year had NAL as a fraction.  
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Under a non-spatial econometric estimation, observations do not depend on location 
(LeSage and Pace, 2009; Elhorst, 2014).  They are independent points and therefore there is no 
correlation between them and their neighbors.  However, LeSage and Pace (2009) explain the 
case of spatial dependency: “In contrast to point observations, for a region we rely on the 
coordinates of an interior point representing the center (the centroid).  An important point is that 
in spatial regression models each observation corresponds to a location or region”.  In non-
spatial models, each observation has a mean of 𝑥𝑖𝛽 and a random component  𝜀𝑖 where the 
observation 𝑖 represents a region or point in space at one location and is considered to be 
independent of observations in other locations.  In other words, independent or statistically 
independent observations imply that 𝐸(𝜀𝑖 𝜀𝑗) = 𝐸(𝜀𝑖)𝐸(𝜀𝑗) = 0.  This assumption of 
independence greatly simplifies models.  
In many cases, this assumption is not applicable and observations located at different 
points or regions are dependent (LeSage and Pace, 2009).  Suppose we have two regions 
(neighbors) 𝑖 and 𝑗.  If these two regions are spatially correlated and normality for error terms is 
assumed, then: 
                     𝑦𝑖 ↔  𝑦𝑗                                                                                                                      (2)                     
 
where the dependent variable (y) in region j influences the dependent variable in its neighbor 
region i, and vice versa.  
All spatial models have a weight matrix (W), which quantifies the spillover between 
regions.  Elhorst (2014) expresses the weight matrix as a tool to describe the spatial arrangement 
of the geographical units in the sample.  There are variety of units of measurement for spatial 
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dependency such as neighbors, distance, and links (Getis, 2007).32 In this study, we conducted 
and applied different weight matrices and chose the appropriate contiguity weight matrix based 
on the nature of the research.  As Debarsy et al. (2012) point out given the cross-border shopping 
of goods a weight matrix for neighbors with border touching seems intuitively appealing.  
The use of spatial difference-in-difference (SDID) models has gained attraction in urban 
economics in recent years (Dubé et al., 2014; Sunak and Madlener, 2014; Heckert, 2015). 
However, to the best of our knowledge, few studies perform SDID model in public health and 
public policy research (Chagas et al. (2016) and Andrade (2016) are noted exceptions).  We 
argue that opioid overdose death rates and Naloxone access laws need to be evaluated within a 
regional framework.  For example, adoption of an access law in one state could well be followed 
by surrounding states.  Marijuana legalization status in U.S. states is a good example of 
mimicking law enactment in neighboring states.  In such cases, not only would opioid overdose 
death rates be affected by its own state level variables, but it also may be affected by neighboring 
state control variables.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 For more details on the differences between the spatial weight matrices, please refer to Elhorst (2014) and Getis (2007). 
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Table 14. List of the Variables Utilized in Overdose Death Research 
Variable Study Region 
Coefficient 
Sign 
Reference 
Poverty  New York City districts + Marzuk et al., 1997 
Income distribution  
New York City 
neighborhoods 
- 
Galea et al., 2003 
Nandi et al., 2006 
External characteristics of neighborhood  
New York City 
neighborhoods 
- Hembree et al., 2005 
Internal characteristics of neighborhood 
New York City 
neighborhoods 
- Hembree et al., 2005 
Police activity 
New York City 
neighborhoods, New 
York City police 
precinct 
+ 
Nandi et al., 2006 
Bohnert et al., 2011 
Unemployment Italy provinces - Gatti et al., 2007 
Per capita GDP Italy provinces + Gatti et al., 2007 
Urbanization Italy provinces + Gatti et al., 2007 
Couples’ separation Italy provinces  Gatti et al., 2007 
Demographic factors (African-American men) 
Chicago 
neighborhoods 
+ Scott et al., 2007 
Location relative to the U.S.-Mexico border New Mexico counties - Shah et al., 2012 
Heroin source/type, price and purity 27 U.S. MSAs +/- Unick et al., 2014 
Educational attainment U.S states - Richardson et al., 2015 
State medical cannabis laws U.S states - Bachhuber et al., 2014 
Uninsured adults and health care cost New Mexico counties - Shah et al., 2012 
Substance Abuse Insurance Mandates U.S states - Selby, 2017 
 
Since medications like Naloxone can be rather easily transferred across state borders, 
users can buy Naloxone in a neighboring state with an access law and use it in their home state 
without an access law.  This type of transmission of Naloxone across state borders could affect 
the opioid overdose death rates in neighboring states.  In addition, the opioid epidemic in the 
U.S. is observed to be clustered in specific regions such as Appalachia and the Southwest33,34 
                                                 
33 For more details, please refer to: 
http://www.realclearhealth.com/articles/2017/06/14/analysis_peering_into_the_nations_opioid_crisis_through_a_regional_lens_1
10633.html 
34 For more details, please refer to: 
http://www.acutisdiagnostics.com/sites/default/files/Peeling_Back_the_Curtain_on_Regional_Variation_in_the_Opioid_Crisis_FI
NAL_June_2017%20%281%29.pdf 
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(see Rudd et al., 2016).  Therefore, analyzing the effectiveness of the Naloxone access law on 
opioid overdose deaths is more appropriate to investigate within a regional framework rather 
than a standard state level analysis.  
When a spatial component (whether it is the spatial component of the dependent variable, 
control variables or the error term) is statistically significant, the coefficients estimated by non-
spatial models (in our case a general DID) would be biased or not efficient.  For example, if the 
spatial component is just in the error term, estimated coefficients in the non-spatial model are 
still unbiased and consistent, but not efficient (Case, 1991).  In addition, variances may be non-
efficient in non-spatial models (Griffith, 2005; LeSage and Pace, 2009).  Accordingly, statistical 
tests such as t- and F-tests may be invalid, leading researchers to interpret their results 
improperly.   
We conduct the estimation process by adding a spatial component to the non-spatial 
econometric analysis in a panel data framework.  The SDID model developed for opioid 
overdose death rate can be written as 
 𝑇𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑇𝑖𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=2 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜌𝑊𝑇𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗𝑡 +
                                   𝜗𝑊𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑗𝑡𝑇𝑗𝑡 + 𝜃𝑊𝑋𝑗𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 +  𝑤𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡            (3)                                         
 
where TODDrate stands for the opioid overdose deaths per 100,000 populations in state i and 
time t, NAL represents a dummy variable whether the state has a Naloxone access law in a given 
year.  X is a vector of demographic variables described above, while 𝑣𝑖 and 𝑤𝑡 are state and year 
fixed effects, respectively.  The terms 𝑊𝑇𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 𝑊𝑁𝐴𝐿 𝑇, and 𝑊𝑋 denote the spatial 
components of opioid overdose death rate, Naloxone access law, and other control variables, 
respectively. 𝜌, 𝜗, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜃 represent the spillover effects of the dependent variable and 
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independent variables, respectively.  These variables explain the effects of dependent variable 
and independent variables of neighboring states (j) on the dependent variable in specific state (i).  
We examine the impact of Naloxone access laws with three different models.  First, 
following Rees et al. (2017), we impose a dummy variable for passage of a Naloxone access law 
at the state level in Model 1.  For Model 2, we assess the impact of access laws by the number of 
days since the effective date of the law.35 To examine the impacts of access laws over time, a 
quadratic form of this variable was included in this model.  Finally, Model 3 provides for a 
breakdown of access laws by their specific provisions.  Since Naloxone access laws are not 
homogenous, to evaluate the effects of access laws on opioid overdose death rates, one needs to 
differentiate between the provisions included in each law.  Keeping NAL 1 for the binary 
variable in Model 1, we control for access law provisions by imposing five binary variables in 
Model 3 with grouping provisions to avoid collinearity:  
NAL 1: Having a Naloxone access law.  
NAL 2: Immunity from criminal liability, civil liability and professional sanctions for 
prescribing, dispensing or distributing Naloxone to a layperson for prescribers and 
dispensers 
NAL 3: Third parties’ authorization to prescribe Naloxone 
NAL 4: Pharmacists are allowed to dispense or distribute naloxone without a patient-
specific prescription from another medical professional 
NAL 5: Immunity from criminal and civil liability administering Naloxone to a layperson  
NAL 6: Removing criminal liability for possession of Naloxone 
                                                 
35 The days after law is measured by counting the days from the effective date to the last day of the year.    
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A priori we would expect these Naloxone access laws to be associated unequivocally 
with greater access to Naloxone. However, whether these laws should lead to improvements in 
drug overdose rates remains an open question. Due to the overdose-reversing properties of 
Naloxone, we expect improved access to reduce overdose deaths. However, if as others have 
found, Naloxone leads to individuals behaving in riskier ways by taking more potent drugs or 
larger amounts of drugs, we may expect access to increase drug deaths. While understanding 
how each different provision will affect individuals is a goal of this research, ultimately, the sign 
and magnitudes of these effects are empirical questions. 
For the X vector of control variables, there is some evidence in the literature that poverty, 
unemployment, uninsured rate, and income inequality are each positively correlated with opioid 
overdose deaths (Galea et al., 2003; Nandi et al., 2006; Gatti et al., 2007; Shah et al., 2012).  
Conversely, income and education have negative relationships with opioid overdose deaths 
(Richardson et al., 2015).  We expect to see positive effects from the availability of legal and 
illegal opioids on opioid overdose death rates.  Medical marijuana laws are expected to have a 
negative effect on opioid overdose death rates because we expect opioids and marijuana to be 
substitutes so that medical marijuana laws will likely reduce the cost of receiving marijuana and 
therefore decrease the quantity of opioids demanded. 
 DATA 
Data for constructing the three models come from a number of different sources.  We use 
data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Wonder for 1999-201636 which 
contain the universe of opioid overdose deaths and opioid overdose death rates by state in the 
                                                 
36 National Vital Statistics System (NVSS) 
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U.S. We focus on the 48 continuous states of the U.S. and Washington, D.C. over this time 
period.  These data were compiled using underlying cause of death compressed mortality files.  
The number of opioid overdose deaths by state were classified using the International 
Classification of Diseases, Tenth Revision (ICD-10).  We included overdose deaths coded as 
unintentional (X40–44), homicide (X85), undetermined intent (Y10–Y14), and suicide cases 
(X60–64).37 Among deaths with opioid overdose as the underlying cause, the type of opioid 
involved is indicated by the following ICD-10 multiple cause-of-death codes: opioids (T40.0, 
T40.1, T40.2, T40.3, T40.4, or T40.6); heroin (T40.1); natural and semisynthetic opioids 
(T40.2); methadone (T40.3); and synthetic opioids other than methadone (T40.4). The dependent 
variable unit is the number of opioid overdose deaths per 100,000 populations. Population data 
are collected from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Wonder.  
For our variable of interest, we create measures of whether each state had a Naloxone 
law, the various provisions of each law, and effective dates from the Prescription Drug Abuse 
Policy System (PDAPS38).  For control variables in the X vector, Unick et al. (2014) recommend 
including illicit drug price.  Without having access to such data for our time frame, we instead 
control for drug arrests and quantity of prescription drug sales. Sale and possession related 
arrests of opium or cocaine and their derivatives (Morphine, Heroin, and Codeine) were provided 
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to control for illicit opioids supply.  The availability of 
prescription opioids comes from controlled substances transactions of prescriptions available 
through Automated Reports and Consolidated Ordering System (ARCOS).39    
                                                 
37 As a robustness check we test the total number of opioid overdose deaths as the dependent variable (not restricted to ICD-10 codes 
recommended by Ruhm (2016)). 
38 Available at: http://pdaps.org/ 
39 Available at: https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/arcos/retail_opioid_summary/ 
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State level economic variables of per pupil spending on education, poverty rate, 
unemployment rate as well as population density and uninsured rate were obtained from the U.S. 
Census Bureau.  Income inequality, high school attainment, and the college attainment data were 
obtained from U.S. state-level income inequality data and annual state-level measures of human 
capital attainment at Mark W. Frank home page.40  Per capita personal income was based on the 
information provided by Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED).41 Employment in mining, 
construction, and manufacturing and labor force were collected from Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS).42  To compute the employment ratio for high-risk injury occupations, we added the 
number of employment in mining, manufacturing and construction and divided it by the total 
labor force. Medical marijuana law data were collected from the leading source for pros and cons 
of controversial issues.43 Finally, the spatial weight matrix (a shape file of U.S. states consisting 
of the latitudinal and longitudinal coordinates of all the 48 states and D.C.) was adapted from the 
U.S. Census Bureau (Tiger) report. 
To control for spillover effects of Naloxone access laws, the 48 continuous U.S. states 
plus District of Colombia were included in our analysis.  In spatial analysis, contiguity and 
neighborhoods play vital roles (Tobler, 1970).  We focused on contiguous states based on the 
first law of geography:  everything is related to everything else, closer things even more so 
(Tobler, 1970).  Descriptive statistics for each variable are reported in Table 15 along with the 
expected signs of Naloxone access law and control variables.  Following previous studies (Rees 
                                                 
40 Available at: http://www.shsu.edu/eco_mwf/inequality.html 
41 Available at: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/release?rid=151 
42 Available at: https://www.bls.gov/sae/data.htm 
43 Available at: http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000881 
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et al., 2017) which found a negative effect of Naloxone access laws on opioid overdose deaths, 
we expect to have a negative effects of the law on opioid overdose death rates. 
METHODS 
Exploring spatial dependency in opioid overdose death rates across states 
As we mentioned in the previous section, the economic distance concept is a motivation 
for spatial spillover effects.  Before analyzing spatial dependency by corresponding econometric 
models, an intuitive way to identify clusters is by looking at a map of overdose death rates. As 
shown in Figure 2, opioid overdose death rates have increased over time.  In 1999, only two 
states had an overdose death rate between 8 and 10 deaths per 100,000 population.  By 2016, 34 
states had overdose death rates between 8 and 40 deaths per 100,000 population. Also, some 
spatial clusters are obvious especially in 2016.  New Mexico had the highest opioid overdose 
death rate in 1999. In 2016, its surrounding states also had high rates of overdose deaths.  
Substantial clustering also exists within states on the east coast.  
Given the fact that opioid overdose death rates show visual evidence of clustering among 
states, the next step is to detect spatial autocorrelation.  Spatial autocorrelation measures the 
interrelationship of opioid overdose death rate across neighboring states.  A common index used 
to discover spatial autocorrelation is the Global Moran’s I index.44 As pointed out by Chen and 
Haynes (2015), Moran’s I is a test on a yearly basis.  A significant and positive z-value for 
Moran’s I index implies a positive spatial autocorrelation.  Table 16 shows the results for 
Moran’s I index for two points of time and its z-statistics and p-value.  These tests reveal that 
there has been and still is (as of 2016) significant spatial autocorrelation among state level opioid 
                                                 
44 More information is available at: http://ceadserv1.nku.edu/longa//geomed/ppa/doc/globals/Globals.htm 
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overdose death rate in the U.S.  This means state level opioid overdose death rates tend to be 
clustered together.  
Moran’s I index assesses the overall presence of spatial autocorrelation.  This index could 
offset the effects of spatial autocorrelation if some observations have a positive spatial 
autocorrelation while the others show a negative spatial autocorrelation.  For further 
examination, we also report the results of local Moran’s I test (LISA).  Scatter plots of LISA 
shows observations in four different quadrants: High value observation surrounded by high value 
observations (i.e. QI: HH) and three other clusterings for LH (QII), HL (QIV), and LL (QIII) 
quadrants.  Figure 4 provides Moran scatter plots of the US opioid overdose death rates in 1999 
and 2016.  This figure illustrates that in both years, most of the states with high overdose rate are 
adjacent to states with high overdose rates.  This also is true for the states with low overdose 
death rates.  Thus, we apply a first-order contiguity weight matrix in our spatial analysis. 
The existence of statistically significant spatial autocorrelation among states implies that 
the ordinary least square estimations (non-spatial models) may lead toward biased estimates of 
the regression results.  Therefore, it is appropriate to apply spatial models in the analysis of 
Naloxone access laws and opioid overdose death rate.  As Delgado and Florax (2015) point out, 
identification of causal effects is no longer valid if the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption 
(SUTVA)45 is violated.  A SUTVA violation means that in determining the treatment effect, 
considering one’s own treatment status is not sufficient.  Treatment status of neighboring regions 
(in our case states) has to be taken into account as well (Delgado and Florax (2015).   
 
 
                                                 
45 Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption: potential outcomes for person i are unrelated to the treatment status of other individuals 
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Table 15. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Expected 
Sign 
Opioid overdose death rates (per 100K pop) 7.05 5.12 0.26 40  
Total opioid overdose death rates (per 100K pop) 7.38 5.32 0.19 41.8  
NAL 1 0.173 0.363 0 1 - 
NAL 2 0.136 0.328 0 1 - 
NAL 3 0.135 0.327 0 1 - 
NAL 4 0.096 0.276 0 1 - 
NAL 5 0.133 0.323 0 1 - 
NAL 6 0.032 0.168 0 1 - 
Days after Naloxone access law (days/1000) 0.234 0.712 0 5.745 - 
Square of the days after Naloxone access law 
(days2/1000) 
349 1,978 0 25,150 + 
Presence of Medical marijuana law 0.25 0.43 0 1 - 
Heroin arrest rate (arrests/100k pop) 138.05 103.15 0.61 761.43 + 
Opioid prescription (kg/100k pop) 56.527 41.023 6.911 496.506 + 
Employment ratio (%) 0.14 0.04 0.002 0.26 + 
Population density (pop./mi2) 342.31 1,242.48 5.028 10,013 -/+ 
Income inequality (Income share for the top %10) (%) 44.72 4.98 33.27 62.17 + 
College attainment (the total number of college 
graduates/ the total state population) (%) 
0.19 0.04 0.10 0.46 - 
Spending on education ($1000) 9.226 2.838 4.169 20.609 - 
Poverty rate (%) 13.38 3.34 5.60 23.90 + 
Unemployment rate (%) 5.71 2.06 2.30 13.70 + 
Uninsured rate (%) 12.69 4.14 3.00 26.10 + 
Median HH income (thousand dollars) 47.15 8.36 29.29 76.16 - 
Per capita income (thousand dollars) 38.03 9.09 20.56 75.75 - 
Number of observations 784  
 
 Table 16. Moran’s I index for State Level Opioid Overdose Death Rates 
 1999 2016 
Moran’s i 0.407 0.581 
z-statistics 5.413 5.842 
p-value 0.010 0.000 
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Figure 3.  Opioid overdose death rates in the U.S. 1999 
and 2016
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Figure 4. Moran’s scatter plot of state Level Opioid 
Overdose Death Rates (1999 and 2016) 
 
 
Spatial econometric analysis 
There are five different spatial models. The first one is the spatial autoregressive lag 
model (SAR) where the dependent variable in neighbor j influences the dependent variable in 
neighbor i and vice versa.  Second, a Spatial Error Model (SEM) assumes dependency in the 
error term.  SLX model or spatial lag of control variables assumes that only control variables 
play a direct role in determining dependent variables.  Lastly, there are Spatial Durbin Model 
(SDM) and Spatial Error Durbin Model (SDEM) that include spatial lags of the control variables 
as well as the dependent variable and a spatial lag of the control variables (WX), as well as 
spatially dependent disturbances.  
As discussed above and based upon the results of the spatial analysis, we have strong 
reasons to suspect that spatial spillovers are important both theoretically and empirically when 
examining the effect of access policy for both state and temporal variation.  To evaluate the 
effects of Naloxone access laws on opioid overdose death rates, we first test a general non-spatial 
specification against SAR and SEM models by conducting a Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test.  In 
both cases, the spatial models were the appropriate specification (LM for non-spatial against 
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SAR = 45.51 and p-value = 0.00, LM for non-spatial against SEM = 10.01 and p-value = 0.00).  
The next step is testing SAR against SEM.  By applying the robust LM test we failed to reject 
that the SAR model is the most appropriate specification46 (LM spatial lag = 148.37 > LM spatial 
error = 112.86).  Knowing that the SAR, SEM, and SLX models are nested within SDM and 
SDEM and for applied works LeSage recommends applying either a SDM or SDEM47, we 
continue our estimations by focusing on SDM model which is a global spatial econometric 
model encompassing both SAR and SLX models.48  
In addition to applying Lagrange multiplier, LM spatial lag, and LM spatial error tests, 
we also applied Bayesian posterior model probabilities to compare SDM and SDEM 
specifications.  Consistent with the results from the LM tests, this analysis provides further 
support of the SDM specification in our context.  
SPATIAL RESULTS 
As discussed in the previous sections, considering cross border issues of Naloxone and 
opioid drugs, it is important to consider the spillover effects between states in regards to 
overdose death rates and Naloxone access laws.  We argue that a first-order contiguity weight 
matrix is the right choice for several reasons.  First, we need the weight matrix to be exogenous 
to our estimation, and a first-order contiguity matrix fits this requirement.  Secondly, 
geographical proximity has been shown to be important for spillovers (e.g., Jaffe, 1989; Jaffe el 
al., 1993; Attila, 2000, Chagas et al., 2016).    
                                                 
46 For more information, please refer to Florax et al. (2003) 
47 For more information, please refer to LeSage (2014) 
48 As noted by LeSage (2014), cross-border shopping has a local spillover rather than a global. We argue that in the case of legal 
prescriptions and illicit drugs, drug transfers occur through more than just neighboring states. In addition, state legislatures may 
adopt Naloxone access laws based upon neighboring states’ overdose death rates and the adoption of an access law.  
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Table 17 presents the spatial regressions results for Models 1 and 2 presented in section 
3.  Within these two models, there are no statistically significant, direct effects of Naloxone 
access laws on overdose death rates.  That our direct effect results are small and statistically 
insignificant suggest that Naloxone laws do not affect overdose rates in the state they are 
enacted. Indirect effects are positive and statistically significant.  When direct and indirect 
effects are combined, both models show positive impacts, meaning that opioid overdose death 
rates increase following the implementation of Naloxone access laws, with the majority of this 
effect coming through spatial spillovers.  
This may seem a counterintuitive result, i.e., that a more lax legislative environment for 
Naloxone in a state leads to more deaths in surrounding states. However, it is important to note 
that Doleac and Mukherjee (2018) find evidence of higher hospitalization rates in states 
following Naloxone laws and some evidence of regional increases in deaths.  They also note 
evidence of increased fentanyl use, a much more potent opiate than even heroin.  
Model 3 differentiates between laws by breaking them down into five provision 
groupings.  Table 18 shows the estimation results for access laws by provision.  Given the 
statistically significant spatial autocorrelation coefficient (𝜌), the parameter estimates in the two-
way fixed effects spatial autoregressive model cannot be interpreted as non-spatial models.  We 
estimate the direct and indirect effects to yield an interpretation of the spatial spillover effects.  
These results show similar outcomes to Models 1 and 2 when we break down these laws by their 
provisions.  With the exception of provisions of immunity from criminal and civil liability for 
administering Naloxone, the direct effects on overdose death rates are small and statistically 
insignificant, showing no evidence of reducing these rates.  This direct effect suggests that some 
aspect of removing criminal liability of Naloxone distribution makes individuals more likely to 
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fatally overdose.  We can only speculate that perhaps this provision removes a stigma from 
taking drugs and further serves as an implicit approval to take more potent drugs (Doleac and 
Mukherjee 2018) or that Naloxone laws are correlated with fentanyl distribution.  
Out of five provision groupings, immunity from criminal liability, civil liability and 
professional sanctions for prescribing, dispensing or distributing Naloxone to a layperson for 
prescribers and dispensers (NAL 2), the ability of prescribers to provide Naloxone to third 
parties (NAL 3), immunity from criminal and civil liability administering Naloxone to a 
layperson (NAL 5), and removing criminal liability for possession of Naloxone (NAL 6) have 
statistically significant indirect effects.  NAL 2, NAL 5, and NAL 6 increase overdose death 
rates in the neighboring states where they are enacted, while the ability of prescribers to provide 
Naloxone to third parties decreases overdose death rates in the neighboring states.  In each case, 
indirect effects are much larger than direct effects, from about 5 to 15 times greater than the 
corresponding direct effects.  For total effects, NAL 5 and NAL 6 are statistically significant and 
positive; while NAL 3 is significantly negative (Table 17). Thus, while both negative and 
positive impacts on overdose death rates are found to exist for Naloxone access law provisions; 
positive impacts via spillover effects dominate the outcome of these laws.   
While these spillover effects are large, we caution restraint when interpreting these 
coefficients. Previous research has differed on the effect of Naloxone laws on overdose deaths.  
Our direct effect results are small and statistically insignificant suggesting that Naloxone laws do 
not affect overdose rates in the state they are enacted.  Several reasons may explain the size and 
direction of these spillover effects.  First, these laws may be enacted in neighboring states 
because of perceived drug risk or even drug deaths occurring in nearby states. Additionally, the 
positive and statistically significant indirect effects of access laws may be explained by their 
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potential impacts on the increased availability of high potency drugs (like heroin) in neighboring 
states. Our logic is that increased access to Naloxone keeps opioid drug abusers alive longer and 
leaves them seeking higher potency drugs, thus leading to more of these drugs flowing through 
illegal drug supply channels across multiple states.    
Other influences on opioid overdose death rates include heroin related arrests and opioid 
prescription with positive and significant direct, indirect (only opioid prescription) and total 
effects (Table 17).  Heroin related crime and prescriptions of opioids both increase opioid 
overdose death rates.  Opioid prescription increases the overdose death rates within the state as 
well as surrounding states, while heroin related crime increases the overdose death rate only 
within the state.   Employment of those who work at mining, construction and manufacture 
industries also increases opioid overdose death rates within the state while decreasing rates in 
neighboring states. 
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Table 17. Estimation Results for Model 1 (dummy of access law NAL 1) and Model 2 (days after 
effective date of access law) 
Variables  Model 1 Model 2 
 Direct Indirect Direct Indirect 
Naloxone access law 1 
 
Days after NAL 
 
Days after NAL^2 
 
Medical marijuana law 
 
Heroin related arrest 
 
Opioid prescription 
 
Employment ratio 
 
Population density 
 
Income inequality index 
 
College graduate  
 
Education spending per student 
 
Poverty  
 
Unemployment  
 
Uninsured  
 
Per capita income 
 
 
0.238 
(0.554) 
- 
 
- 
 
1.318*** 
(0.001) 
0.008*** 
(0.000) 
0.010*** 
(0.003) 
34.104*** 
(0.002) 
0.002** 
(0.032) 
-0.011 
(0.825) 
-0.060 
(0.434) 
0.116 
(0.431) 
0.169 
(0.307) 
-0.161 
 (0.205) 
0.052 
(0.321) 
-2.130*** 
(0.002) 
 
5.767*** 
(0.000) 
- 
 
- 
 
2.687* 
(0.058) 
0.007 
(0.225) 
0.021* 
(0.098) 
-68.280** 
(0.039) 
-0.006 
(0.327) 
-0.035 
(0.817) 
0.118 
(0.633) 
0.045 
(0.921) 
1.570*** 
(0.004) 
-0.529 
(0.186) 
0.333* 
(0.052) 
4.246* 
(0.096) 
 
- 
 
0.251 
(0.583) 
-0.00001 
(0.812) 
1.109** 
(0.010) 
0.008*** 
(0.000) 
0.010*** 
(0.002) 
36.500*** 
(0.001) 
0.003 
(0.014) 
-0.015 
(0.757) 
-0.034 
(0.653) 
0.124 
(0.425) 
-0.043 
(0.791) 
-0.163 
(0.198) 
0.071 
(0.195) 
-2.571*** 
(0.000) 
- 
 
7.656*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
1.772 
(0.217) 
0.009* 
(0.086) 
0.024** 
(0.048) 
-59.90* 
(0.061) 
0.009 
(0.142) 
-0.052 
(0.736) 
0.151 
(0.536) 
-0.019 
(0.966) 
1.210 
(0.822) 
-0.359 
(0.353) 
0.420** 
(0.025) 
1.84 
(0.474) 
𝛒 
 
0.49 
(0.000) 
0.48 
(0.000) 
𝐑𝟐 0.85 0.85 
Observations 882 882 
Note: Numbers in the parentheses represent p-values  
*, **, and *** refer to 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 18.  Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of SDM Model (Based on Model 3) 
Variables Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect 
Naloxone access law 2 
 
Naloxone access law 3 
 
Naloxone access law 4 
 
Naloxone access law 5 
 
Naloxone access law 6 
 
Medical marijuana law 
 
Heroin related arrest 
 
Opioid prescription 
 
Employment ratio 
 
Population density 
 
Income inequality index 
 
College graduate rate 
 
Education spending per student 
 
Poverty rate 
 
Unemployment rate 
 
Uninsured rate 
 
Per capita income 
 
-0.199 
(0.710) 
-0.555 
(0.382) 
-0.237 
(0.708) 
1.994***  
(0.009) 
0.373 
 (0.539) 
0.815* 
(0.059) 
0.008*** 
(0.000) 
0.012*** 
(0.000) 
31.699*** 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.214) 
-0.008 
(0.868) 
-0.048 
(0.508) 
0.155 
(0.289) 
0.011 
(0.941) 
0.035 
(0.787) 
-0.0007 
(0.987) 
-2.179*** 
(0.002) 
2.970**  
(0.016) 
-5.948*** 
(0.006) 
4.165 
(0.102) 
9.659*** 
(0.001) 
5.710** 
(0.012) 
0.308 
(0.825) 
0.005 
(0.271) 
0.030** 
(0.016) 
-49.547  
(0.116) 
-0.002  
(0.744) 
-0.026  
(0.859) 
0.163 
(0.491) 
0.432  
(0.322) 
0.636  
(0.218) 
0.274 
(0.518) 
0.030 
(0.855) 
3.584  
(0.149) 
2.771 
(0.178) 
-6.503**  
(0.013) 
3.928 
(0.179) 
11.653*** 
(0.001) 
6.084** 
(0.017) 
1.124 
(0.504) 
0.014**  
(0.017) 
0.042***  
(0.003) 
-17.847  
(0.609) 
-0.0003  
(0.957) 
-0.034 
(0.835) 
0.114  
(0.678) 
0.587  
(0.240) 
0.647  
(0.257) 
0.310  
(0.500) 
0.030  
(0.877) 
1.404  
(0.614) 
𝛒 
 
0.47 
(0.000) 
𝐑𝟐 0.86 
Observations 882 
Note: Numbers in the parentheses represent p-values. 
 *, **, and *** refer to 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 
Per capita income has a significant and negative direct effect on opioid overdose death 
rates.  The implication is that states with higher per capita incomes have lower opioid overdose 
death rates, while states with lower per capita incomes suffer from higher opioid overdose death 
rate.  Contrary to our expectations, states which passed a medical marijuana law have slightly 
higher overdose death rates. Other variables (income inequality, education spending per student, 
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poverty rate, and uninsured rate) do not have statistically significant effects on overdose death 
rates.   
In terms of control variables, our results are consistent with those found by Keyes et al. 
(2014) but contradict Gatti et al. (2007). The Gatti et al. study focuses on Italy, a very different 
context from ours.  
Finally, as a robustness check, a new dependent variable of total opioid overdose death 
rates introduced in section 4 is examined.  As pointed out by Rees et al. (2017), opioid overdose 
deaths published by CDC is based on the underlying cause of death (accidental, intentional, and 
undetermined intent), for example see Ruhm (2016).  For this check, the new dependent variable 
represents a comprehensive and unrestricted measure of opioid overdoses using Model 3.  The 
relative magnitude and sign for all statistically significant effects from Naloxone access law 
provision groupings and all other variables are unchanged from Table 18.49   
CONCLUSIONS  
Opioid overdose deaths are the leading cause of unintentional death in the U.S. These 
drugs are associated with more deaths than car accidents and guns. To address this nationwide 
public health emergency, state governments have implemented Naloxone access laws to ease 
access to this overdose reversal drug.  In this research, we examine the impact of these Naloxone 
access laws on opioid overdose deaths and their spillover effects to surrounding states.  No 
endogeneity between overdose death rates and access laws is found to exist.  
We applied spatial econometrics models to avoid potential bias in coefficient estimation 
and our regression results from all three models indicate no matter how we control for Naloxone 
                                                 
49 These estimated results are available from the corresponding author upon request. 
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access laws, we find no statistical evidence to show that Naloxone access laws help to reduce 
drug overdose death rates. When measuring Naloxone access laws in three different ways, 
positive spillover effects of these laws are statistically significant and dominate direct effects in 
terms of magnitude.  Thus, Naloxone access laws have more regional than state level effects.  
We are the first study to explore the spatial spillovers of these Naloxone access laws across 
states.     
It is useful to compare the magnitude of the aggregate effects from groupings of 
Naloxone access law provisions with the effects for heroin related arrests and drug 
prescriptions.  To do that, we use state level means to compare relative magnitudes.  For 
example, if an overdose prevention policy could reduce opioid prescriptions by 50%, the impact 
of this policy would reduce opioid overdose death rates by slightly over one per 100,000 
population.  Conversely, the total effect of enactment of a Naloxone access law containing the 
three significant provisions (NAL 3, 5, and 6) results in an increase in overdose death rates by 11 
per 100,000 population.  This simple calculation indicates that compared to a supply side policy, 
the overall effect of a Naloxone access law on opioid overdose death rates is much higher, 
however, in the opposite of the intended direction.  
Spatial econometrics has an important role to play in research on drug epidemics (see 
e.g., Partridge et al. (2012) for a general discussion of the importance of spatial econometrics).50 
Due to movement of opioid drugs and Naloxone across state borders, in this paper, we 
demonstrate that the use of conventional, non-spatial analyses may be biased in this 
environment.  Overall, due to a statistically significant spatial autoregressive component, the 
opioid overdose death rate in one state is associated with opioid overdose death rates in its 
                                                 
50 For more information, please refer to Gibbons and Overman (2012), McMillen (2012), and Corrado and Fingleton (2012). 
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neighboring states.  This result means that there are spillover effects in opioid overdose death 
rates among neighboring regions (states).  An increasing trend in opioid overdose death rates in 
one particular state may be followed by neighboring states as well.   
Naloxone as a harm reduction strategy works well by reversing overdoses and saving 
lives. To combat opioid overdose deaths, however, Naloxone access laws do not appear to be a 
suitable strategy. The fight against opioid overdose rates requires policy makers to focus on 
dealing with opioid addiction and find ways to treat addiction. State level enactment of a 
Naloxone access law can be viewed as a starting point to a strategy of implementing and 
expanding access to save lives, but not as a sufficient response to the opioid crisis and overdose 
problems.  In addition to enactment of access laws, both federal and state governments should 
consider the next steps such as policy recommendations presented by Clark (2017) (e.g. team-
based care model, more collaboration with pharmacists, expanding harm reduction treatment 
model).  Both federal and state governments need to be involved in preventive policies more 
focused on regional rather than state-specific solutions.  
The combination of Naloxone access law and increasing availability of high potency 
drugs could be partially responsible for not finding a significant result within the states that pass 
such a law (Doleac and Mukherjee 2018). We are not able to control for an accurate 
measurement of opioid potency, but studies suggest opioid users shift toward consuming 
stronger, more illicit drugs like heroin and synthetic opioids like fentanyl when policies are 
enacted limiting opioid misuse (Alpert et al. Forthcoming; Evans et al. 2018; Jones et al. 2018; 
Gladden et al. 2016).51 There are two channels to explaining this shift: less availability of 
                                                 
51 For more information, please refer to: https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/5/8/15454832/fentanyl-carfentanil-opioid-
epidemic 
84 
 
prescription painkillers and drug users seeking out a stronger high.52 In addition, cross border 
movement of Naloxone may influence our results for the direct effects of access laws.  
Our results are broadly consistent with Doleac and Mukherjee (2018), who point that 
while broadening Naloxone access increases opioid-related emergency room visits and opioid-
related theft, it does not reduce overdose deaths.  Conversely, while Rees et al. (2017) show that 
the heroin related overdose deaths are not associated with the Naloxone access law, they provide 
support for a protective effect of Naloxone access laws on overall drug-related deaths. We 
contribute to this literature by showing that Naloxone access has regional effects.  Failing to 
control for spillover effects across state borders likely biases results.   
We recognize several limitations in our research. First, many states have only recently 
enacted Naloxone access laws.  Our data cover years 1999 to 2016, for those 19 states with 
newly enacted laws in 2015 and 2016, we do not have post implementation data.  Empirical 
results may change with more post implementation data for these 19 states.  Second, county level 
analysis would be preferable to assess the spillover effects across states, but these data were not 
consistently and publicly available for overdose death rates.53   
One future avenue of research is to employ a mechanism that differentiates the 
relationship between neighbors by whether or not they have an access law.  Our analysis does 
not differentiate between these types of neighboring states and this distinction may be important 
in determining the magnitude of the spillover effect.  Further research also should consider 
applying a hierarchical analysis and provide spillover estimates at both levels of the hierarchy 
(including both county and state level data in county level model).  Finally, research should 
                                                 
52 For more information, please refer to: https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/8/3/16079772/opioid-epidemic-drug-
overdoses 
53 For example, the CDC does not publish county level observations with less than nine overdose deaths. 
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examine enactment of Naloxone access laws in conjunction with other policy responses, such as 
increased intervention and treatment programs for addiction to assess the impact of multiple 
policies on overdose death rates as well to limit the unintended consequences of Naloxone access 
on risky drug behaviors.    
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CHAPTER 4: AIR QUALITY AND ASTHMA HOSPITALIZATION: 
EVIDENCE OF PM2.5 CONCENTRATION IN PENNSYLVANIA 
COUNTIES 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Ambient air pollution adversely impacts air quality and human health (Nel, 2005; Kampa 
and Castanas, 2008; Anderson et al., 2012). The National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) 
set by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) include six principal pollutants (i.e., Carbone 
Monoxide (CO), Lead (Pb), Nitrogen Dioxide (NO2), Ozone (O3), Particulate Matters (PM), and 
Sulfur Dioxide (SO2)) as “criteria air pollutants” (EPA, 2016). Over the last few decades, air 
pollution concerns have changed from concentrations of SO2 and coarse particles towards more 
traffic-related air pollutants (TAP) (i.e., nitrogen oxides (NOx), small particles and organic 
compounds) (Pénard-Morand et al., 2010). The national average trend of SO2 air quality shows an 
87% decrease between 1980-2016 (EPA, 2018a). With decreasing trends in SO2, ozone, and nitrogen 
dioxide, particulates have gained more attention (Brunekreef and Holgate, 2002).  
The World Health Organization (WHO) named particulate matter (PM) as the pollutant that 
affects people more than any other pollutant (WHO, 2016). The severity and magnitude of PM health 
impacts is a function of its size. The smaller the size of PM, the more potential there is to cause 
severe damage to the human body (EPA, 2018b). The negative health impacts of PM are widely 
discussed in the literature (Pope et al., 2009; Raaschou-Nielsen, 2013; Wang et al., 2014; Zhu et al., 
2017).  More specifically, many researchers have investigated the effects of short-term and long-
term exposure to PM and resulting asthma symptoms (Silverman and Ito, 2010; Samoli et al., 2011; 
Iskandar et al., 2012; Zang et al., 2015).  
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The EPA has continuously updated its standards for criteria air pollutants since the passage 
of the Clean Air Act of 1990. For instance, the standards for PM have changed three times and ozone 
pollution standards have changed two times. One element of enforcement for these standards is 
designation of attainment or nonattainment by an area. Attainment/ nonattainment classification by 
EPA is based on the level of air pollutants. In the case of a geographic area where pollutant levels 
are below the NAAQS threshold, this area is categorized as an attainment area. Unlike an attainment 
area, a nonattainment area deals with persistent air quality problems and violates federal health-
related standards for outdoor quality (Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, 2016).  
As a demonstration, Appendix I shows nonattainment designation for PM 2.5 concentrations 
in Pennsylvania are located primarily at or adjacent to metropolitan areas in the southeast and 
southwestern portions of the state during the time-period 2001 to 2014.  Pollution dischargers within 
nonattainment areas are required to comply with tighter environmental regulations than similar 
dischargers in attainment areas. For instance, in nonattainment areas, existing pollution sources are 
required to install “reasonably available control technology” (RACT) while new sources of pollution 
are required to achieve the “lowest available emission rate” in addition to the RACT requirement 
(Curtis, 2018).        
The main objective in this research is to examine what factors, including PM 2.5 
concentrations, explain asthma hospitalization rates in Pennsylvania. Applying a spatial regression 
model, this analysis provides us with estimates of both within county and spillover effects among 
contiguous counties from PM2.5 concentrations. The spillover analysis allows us to document the 
existence of biases that would be found when using standard, non-spatial models in estimating the 
impacts of PM2.5 concentrations.   
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By imposing a prevailing wind pattern in deriving the weight matrix, positive and significant 
effects of PM2.5 concentrations are found to occur on asthma hospitalization rate both within county 
and in neighboring counties.  These results reveal that county PM2.5 concentrations are associated 
with higher asthma hospitalization rates in neighboring counties, and within the county itself.  Thus, 
important spillover effects exist from the PM2.5 concentrations on asthma hospitalization rates.    
The main contribution of this research to the literature is investigating the spillover effects 
of the sources of PM2.5 pollutions on asthma hospitalization rates.  In addition, the study introduces 
a new approach to evaluating who is considered neighboring regions based upon prevailing wind 
direction when analyzing the health effects of air quality.  After examining the literature, no previous 
study has controlled for the spatial interaction between PM2.5 concentrations and asthma 
hospitalization rates, so that the regional aspects of PM2.5 concentrations have not been investigated.  
Since PM2.5 and other air pollutant concentrations move through the atmosphere, neglecting their 
transportation underestimates the real impact of air quality.    
The rest of the manuscript proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background information 
on national and states’ trends in asthma and its associated costs to society.  Section 3 discusses 
ambient air pollution and, specifically, PM2.5 concentrations and asthma.  Section 4 explains the 
study area.  Section 5 provides details of the model developed for this research.  Section 6 describes 
the data and spatial data considerations.  Section 7 provides the results and section 8 concludes with 
a discussion and policy implications. 
ASTHMA: SYMPTOMS, TIME TREND, AND COST  
Asthma is a chronic respiratory and inflammatory lung disease characterized by episodes or 
attacks of impaired breathing. Even though scientists argue that there is not a specific, well-known 
cause for asthma, a combination of environmental factors and genetics are considered as the disease 
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triggers (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2013). Being exposed to multiple 
environmental factors exacerbate asthma symptoms. Akinbami et al. (2011) and Akinbami et al. 
(2012) list airway irritants such as tobacco smoke and air pollution, allergens, respiratory infections, 
stress and exercise among common asthma attach triggers that exacerbate symptoms.  According to 
Bostantzoglou et al. (2015), asthma symptoms may include coughing, shortness of breath, wheezing, 
chest tightness and chest pain and be caused by inflammation and narrowing of small airways. 
Whether the disease severity is mild or persistent, a person’s quality of life may be affected by 
asthma. People with a mild disease may suffer severe attacks as well as those with a more severe and 
persistent symptom.  
National and state asthma trend 
Since the early 1980s, asthma has shown an upward trend in all ages, genders, and racial 
groups in the U.S. (Asher et al., 2006; National Center for Health Statistics, 2017). About 25 million 
Americans currently suffer from asthma, about one in every 13 people. Asthma is leading chronic 
disease and the third leading cause of hospitalization among individuals under 18 years of age 
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2017). 
Figure 5 shows the number of current prevalence (current prevalence is defined as those who 
answered "yes" to both "Have you ever been told by a doctor or other health professional that you 
had asthma?" and "Do you still have asthma?") of asthma in the U.S. between 2001 and 2015. Even 
though the overall trend of asthma’s current prevalence is increasing on both the national and the 
state levels over a period of 15 years, individual states follow a different pattern.  
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Figure 5. National current asthma prevalence, 2001-2015 
 
 
The Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) provides the current asthma 
prevalence on the state level. Florida, Alabama, Pennsylvania, and Utah are among the high increase 
states for adult asthma prevalence. Compared to the average percentage increase in the U.S. between 
2001-2015 (43%), Pennsylvania experienced a slightly higher increase rate at 47%. 
The burdensome cost of asthma on society 
Asthma can affect people of different age and racial groups, but is more common among 
minorities.  Asthma represents a significant burden on individuals and society in terms of reducing 
productivity and increasing healthcare system demands (Crighton et al., 2012). In estimating the total 
cost of disease, three classifications of cost are considered. Costs related to management, 
complementary investigation or treatment and other costs like domestic or professional preventive 
measures, assistance in home care, and transportation to medical visits are categorized as direct costs.  
Indirect costs include work-related losses whether it is related to temporary, early, or permanent 
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or suffering, limitation of physical activities and job changes are classified as intangible costs (Nunes 
et al., 2017).  
According to the EPA’s asthma fact report, “asthma accounts for 14.2 million physician 
office visits, 439,000 discharges from hospital inpatient care, and 1.8 million emergency department 
visits each year” (EPA, 2016, p. 1).  In 2008, 14.2 million reported asthma as the reason for missed 
days of work (CDC, 2014). Reports show asthma accounts for 13.8 million missed school days in 
2013 (United States Environmental Protection Agency, 2017).  
In a number of studies, researchers estimate the costs associated with asthma. Stanford et al. 
(1999) assess the treatment cost of asthma in which the patient goes to the emergency department 
(ED). They report that, on average, each American paid $234.48 for an ED visit in 1996-1997. In a 
more recent assessment, Wang et al. (2014) report an estimate of $1,502 for asthma care charges in 
the ED based on data for 2006-2008. Average asthma hospitalization cost is much higher than an 
ED visit. Most of the cost of hospitalization belongs to inpatient nursing care and an average hospital 
visit of 3.8 days costs $3,102.53. Barret et al. (2014) differentiate between asthma hospitalization 
costs for adults versus children. While each hospital stays for a child in 2010 averaged a total of 
$3,600, the total cost for an adult was $6,600 for each hospital stay.   
What the previous studies have in common is a steady increase in asthma cost. The most 
recent estimates for the annual economic cost of asthma in the U.S. shows an increase from $12 
billion in 1994 to $56 billion in 2011 (NHAMCS, 2010; NHAMCS, 2011a; NHAMCS, 2011b). 
Direct costs account for $50.1 billion, mostly for hospital stays. The rest of the costs include lost pay 
from sickness or death and lost work output from missed school or work days ($3.8 billion) and 
premature death ($2.1 billion) (Barnett and Nurmagambetov, 2011; CDC, 2011). The cost involving 
asthma hospitalization in Pennsylvania follows the same increasing trend over years (Pennsylvania 
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Department of Health, 2012). Although there is no cure for asthma, it could be controlled by limiting 
exposure to triggers. In the next section, the connection between ambient air pollution and PM2.5 will 
be discussed. 
Asthma and ambient air pollution 
Ambient air pollution impacts public health both on short and long-term bases.  The most 
recent estimate reports that outdoor air pollution is responsible for more than 3% of the annual 
disability-adjusted life years lost in 2010 (Guarnieri and Blames, 2014).  Traffic and fossil-fuel 
power generation contribute the largest shares to urban air pollution (Perera, 2017; Cohen et al., 
2004). With the increasing rate of urbanization in the U.S., more individuals face the negative effects 
of exposure to pollution. In general, the association between exposure to ambient air pollution and 
human health outcomes has been addressed in both older and more recent studies. Specifically, the 
following health conditions have received attention: cardiovascular and respiratory diseases 
(Schwartz and Morris, 1995; Brook et al., 2004; Brook, 2008), lung cancer (Hamra et al., 2015; 
Cohen and Pope, 1995; Raaschou-Nielsen, 2013; Nafstad et al., 2003), low birth weight (Duagandzic 
et al., 2006; Pedersen et al., 2013; Yang and Chou, 2015; Yang et al., 2017), and morbidity and 
mortality (Currie and Neidell, 2005; Krewski et al., 2009; Woodruff et al., 2008). 
The negative effects of PM2.5 on human health in general and particularly on asthma are at 
the core of this study. Many researchers address the effects of short-term and long-term exposure to 
PM2.5 (Tatum and Shapiro, 2005; Eder et al., 2006; Künzli et al., 2009; Andersen et al., 2012; Harris 
et al, 2017; Vermchuk et al., 2018). For example, a one-year exposure to 10 µg/m3 in PM2.5  has been 
estimated to increase mortality by 7.5% (Global Catholic Climate Movement, 2017). In another 
recent study, scientists show that an annual exposure increase of 10 µg/m3 for PM2.5 leads to an 
average loss of life expectancy between 9 and 11 years (Andersen, 2017).   One of the issues with 
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PM2.5 concentrations is that there is not an exact threshold for the concentration level.  Recent studies 
show that the harmful effects are observed even in areas with concentration less than a third of the 
EPA current standard (Datz, 2015). 
Inhalation of particulate matter has been estimated to be responsible for 500,000 excess 
deaths each year worldwide (WHO, 1994). In a study done by the Schneider et al. (2010), estimates 
for the health impacts of PM2.5 emitted from coal-fired power plants and automobiles in the U.S. 
show over 13,000 deaths, 9,700 hospitalizations, and 20,000 heart attacks in 2010 with a total 
monetized value of more than $100 billion. Beelen et al. (2014), Schwartz et al. (2008), and 
Schneider et al. (2010) argue that long-term exposure to PM2.5 is associated with higher mortality 
risk, even when concentrations are below the standard limit. In other words, they believe there is no 
“safe threshold” for PM.  
Glad et al. (2012), and U.S. EPA, (2011) show the impacts of PM2.5 on asthma emergency 
department visits and early deaths, respectively.  Mann et al (2010), Meng et al (2010), Liu et al. 
(2009), Jacquemin et al. (2012), Malig et al. (2013), Samoli et al. (2011), and Silverman et al. (2010) 
describe the effects of PM2.5 on asthma symptoms.  Riedl and Diaz (2005), Namdeo et al. (2011), 
Ristovski et al. (2012), and WHO (2016) discuss the effects of PM2.5 on respiratory and 
cardiovascular disease. Lipsett et al. (1997) show the relationship between emergency room visits 
and exposure to PM10. Nel (2005) relates the exacerbation of asthma and chronic bronchitis to 
exposure to PM10 and PM2.5.  WHO (2016) also reveals an association between PM2.5 plus PM10 and 
lung cancer.  
While numerous studies have analyzed the relationship between ambient air pollutants and 
asthma, evidence of this association on a regional scale is still mixed. The discussion presented by 
North Carolina Attorney General in 2006 arguing pollution from TVA’s coal-fired power plants in 
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Tennessee causing damages the health of North Carolina’s residents is an example of the regional 
effects of ambient air pollution (Environmental Appeals Court, 2008). No previous research, 
however, has estimated the spatial spillover of PM2.5 pollution.  Due to a misspecification issue when 
not accounting for spatial spillover, the results of any regression estimation may be biased. In other 
words, when using a non-spatial regression analysis, we assume health outcomes at a county basis, 
like asthma hospitalization, are independent of the pollution levels (PM2.5 concentrations for 
example) in neighboring counties.  This assumption ignores the effects of PM2.5 concentrations on 
adjacent counties. By ignoring spatial spillover effects, the total effect of PM2.5 concentrations on 
health outcomes may be underestimated.  
STUDY AREA 
Asthma related indicators are not available for all the states on a county level. Because of 
this data limitation, instead of a regional or national analysis, we focus on one state, Pennsylvania.  
Asthma in Pennsylvania is a serious concern. In 2017, the current asthma prevalence rate in 
Pennsylvania for adults was reported at 10.9%; that is far higher than the average rate among adults 
in the U.S. (7.6%) (Henry J Kaiser Family Foundation, 2017). Delaware, Philadelphia, Montgomery, 
Bucks, and Washington are the counties with the highest asthma hospitalization rate, while Mifflin, 
Snyder, Juniata, Clinton, and Huntington counties have the lowest number of asthma 
hospitalizations. What the counties with a high asthma hospitalization rate and counties with a low 
asthma hospitalization rate have in common is their population density. Counties with a higher 
population density are struggling with more asthma triggers than counties with lower asthma 
hospitalization rate, which are usually more rural.   
According to 2015 Pennsylvania asthma fact sheet in 2013, the average cost for inpatient 
hospitalization was $26,952 which is significantly higher than the national average ($6,600) 
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(Pennsylvania Department of Health, 2015). While the cost involving asthma hospitalization in 
Pennsylvania is much higher than the U.S. average, there are other states, such as California and 
Wisconsin where the average cost per asthma hospitalization is also much higher than the U.S. 
average. For example, the average cost per asthma hospitalization in California in 2010 was $33,749. 
The total health care cost involving asthma and absenteeism for 2010 was estimated to be 
approximately $1.7 billion in Pennsylvania. With an almost 50 percent increase projected by 2020, 
asthma costs are estimated to be approximately $2.6 billion, which is an increased burden on the 
state economy at 0.34% of the state GDP as of 2017. 
MODELS  
A spatial regression model is used to investigate the impacts of PM2.5 concentrations on 
asthma hospitalization rates.  Spatial regression models differ from regression models by inclusion 
of a spatial interrelationship between observations of geographic areas such as cities, counties, states, 
or even countries (Elhorst, 2014). In a spatial model, each observation belongs to a location whereas 
observations in a non-spatial regression are independent (LeSage and Pace, 2009). This locational 
linkage is a fundamental point for the observation dependency assumption in spatial regression.  
Among the three types of spatial interaction effects, this study focuses on exogenous 
interactions among the independent variable (X). The spatial lag of X model (SLX) assumes that the 
dependent variable for each observational unit depends on an independent variable from other units 
of observations.  
Independent variable x of unit j  ↔  Dependent variable y of unit i 
A SLX model can be expressed as  
𝑌 =  𝛼ι𝑁 + 𝑋𝛽 + 𝑊𝑋𝜃 + 𝑢                                                                                          (1) 
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where Y is asthma hospitalization rate, WX denotes the interaction among the independent variables.  
𝛽 and 𝜃 represent a K × 1 vector of parameters to be estimated. W is the spatial weight matrix which 
accounts for identification of neighbors. There are four types of spatial weight matrices commonly 
used in applied studies: (i) p-order binary contiguity matrices. Contiguity weight matrices assume 
only those units of observations that share a common border are neighbors (p = 1 also called first-
order neighbors). When p = 2, neighbors and neighbors of neighbors are considered and so on; (ii) 
inverse distance matrices are based on distance between observation i and j; (iii) q-nearest neighbor 
matrices when q is a positive and an integer number defined based on the research question by the 
researcher; and (iv) block diagonal matrices when a group of units have intercorrelation with each 
other, but not with the rest of the observations (Elhorst, 2014).  
As pointed out by Anselin and Rey (1991), the proper choice of a spatial weight matrix is an 
important issue in empirical research. Generally, all mentioned forms of neighbors in spatial models 
deal with symmetric weight matrices. However, sometimes the most accurate definition of neighbors 
does not follow a symmetric form. Commuting flows in the transportation literature and regional 
labor market performance are two well-known examples of asymmetric spatial weight matrices. 
More related to our study, Chen and Ye (2018) capture the effect of wind direction on the PM10 
concentrations at the municipal level in China as an example of a dynamic and asymmetric spatial 
weight matrix dependent on weather patterns.  
Yang et al. (2017) and Yang and Chou (2015) explore the effects maternal exposure to 
downwind sulfur dioxide levels on the occurrence of low birth weight (LBW). They used zip code 
level of observations and control for wind direction by implementing a four-step procedure. Since 
these two studies did not apply a spatial regression model, this research is motivated by Cheng et al. 
(2014) and Chen and Ye (2018) who introduce dynamic, asymmetric weight matrices into traffic 
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modeling and PM10 concentrations, respectively. These authors argue that for some cases, such as 
network data and PM10 concentrations, a general homogeneous spatial weight matrix is inadequate 
and we need to apply a heterogeneous (and/or dynamic) spatial weight matrix.  
Applying this same rationale, our study introduces an empirical model based on a weight 
matrix built upon prevailing wind direction.  Based on this prevailing wind pattern, unit i is 
considered a neighbor for unit j if and only if it is located upwind of j.  Since unit j is downwind of 
unit i, unit j is not considered a neighbor for unit i. Following this logic, a weight matrix is 
constructed based upon the annual average prevailing wind map for Pennsylvania counties (World 
Forecast Directory, 2019).  
Figure 6. Annual prevailing wind direction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 shows the annual prevailing wind directions in the U.S. Based upon this map, the 
prevailing wind direction in Pennsylvania is southwest to northeast.  According to this prevailing 
wind direction, for instance, Washington County is considered to be a neighbor of Allegany and 
Westmoreland Counties, but Allegany County or Westmoreland County are not neighbors for 
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Washington County.  Since a weight matrix needs to be exogenous to the estimation procedure, a 
geographical weight matrix based upon prevailing wind direction fits this requirement. The notion 
of geographical proximity has been applied widely in previous literature (e.g., Jaffe, 1989; Jaffe el 
al., 1993; Varga, 2000; Chagas et al., 2016).  
In addition to ambient PM2.5 concentrations, empirical studies have shown several other 
factors are associated with asthma incidents. Included among the independent variables are:  
smoking rate (Chen et al., 1999; Thomson et al., 2004; Gilliland et al., 2006), and population density 
(Leinberger, 2010; Solé et al., 2007) and per capita income.  Each control variable is expected to be 
positively correlated with asthma incidence.  Per capita income level has been shown to be negatively 
correlated with asthma incidence (Kozyrskyj et al., 2010), while weather variables of precipitation 
and humidity have had mixed effects in the literature (Jerrett et al., 2008; Ho et al., 2007).  
The empirical model is defined as:  
𝐴𝑠𝑡ℎ𝑚𝑎𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑀2.5𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 +  𝛽4𝑆𝑚𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝜃𝑊𝑃𝑀2.5𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑗𝑡 +  𝑣𝑖 +  𝑤𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                              
(2)                                                                     
where 𝐴𝑠𝑡ℎ𝑚𝑎𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 stands for the asthma hospitalization rate in county i and time t, 
𝑃𝑀2.5𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 represents PM2.5 concentrations in county i and time t,  𝑆𝑚𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 is 
the smoking rate in county i and time t, 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 shows the population density in county 
i and time t, Precipitation shows the precipitation in county i and time t, while 𝑣𝑖 and 𝑤𝑡 are county 
and year fixed effects, respectively.  With county fixed effects, there is not a need to control for the 
availability of hospitals in each county, as the number of hospitals in each county does not change 
very much over time the same as population break down, which is not changing disproportionately 
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in different counties over time.  The term 𝑊𝑃𝑀2.5𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 denotes the spatial components 
of PM2.5 concentrations. 𝜃 represents the spillover effects of PM2.5 concentrations. This coefficient 
explains the effects of PM2.5 concentrations of neighboring county (j) on the asthma hospitalization 
rate in county (i).  
Elhorst (2014) notes that “for the specification of more complicated behavioral hypotheses, 
including effects” (time fixed effect, space fixed effect, and two-way fixed effect) (p. 2). Spatial units 
have unique characteristics which are not always possible to control for all of them. Panel estimation 
introduces a dummy variable for spatial units in the estimation to capture unobservable predictors 
for units (𝑣𝑖). Our model also controls for time fixed effects to capture unobservable predictors over 
time (𝑤𝑡).   
DATA 
Data for constructing the empirical models come from different sources. The rate of 
hospitalizations for asthma are derived from the National Environmental Public Health Tracking 
Program (NEPHTP) for 2001-2014 and classified using the International Classification of Diseases, 
ninth Revision (ICD-9). We work with both age-adjusted hospitalization rate and crude 
hospitalization rate. Rates are age-adjusted applying the direct method using 2000 U.S. standard 
population (Klein and Schoenborn, 2001). The data covers ICD-9-CM: 493.XX diagnosis codes. 
More asthma related indicators such as asthma prevalence among adults, asthma prevalence among 
children, and emergency department visits for asthma are reported, but only over a more limited 
number of years and states. By definition, hospitalization data does not include asthma among 
individuals who do not receive medical care or who have not been hospitalized, including those who 
die in emergency rooms, in nursing homes, or at home without being admitted to a hospital, and 
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those treated in outpatient settings. NEPHTP provides asthma hospitalization information by 
counties for 28 selected states. Data are based on the date of admission rather than the date of 
discharge. Data represents the number of admissions rather than the number of individuals admitted 
to the hospital. In most cases, admissions of residents to out-of-state hospitals are excluded. Data are 
based on the county of individual residency.   
For the independent variable of interest, we created a measurement of annual PM2.5 
concentrations level based on data provided by CDC-NEPHTP. NEPHTP reports different air 
quality indicators, such as air toxics, mortality benefit associated with reducing PM2.5 concentrations 
level, and days above regulatory standard for Ozone and PM2.5. PM2.5 concentrations levels are based 
on seasonal averages and daily measurement for monitor and modeled data.  A Downscaler (DS) 
model is applied to predict the measurements for county and day observations with missing values 
in monitoring data.  The data generation process in DS is based on statistical fusion of the Air Quality 
System (AQS) and Community Multiscale Air Quality (CMAQ) model-predicted concentration 
values. AQS was used for observations with monitoring data. 
Population data come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Precipitation data are 
collected through PRISM climate group is supported by the USDA Risk Management Agency, and 
the National Center for Biotechnology Information published cigarette smoking prevalence in U.S. 
counties. Finally, for the spatial weight matrix, a shape file of Pennsylvania counties consisting of 
the latitudinal and longitudinal coordinates of all the 67 counties is adapted from the U.S. Census 
Bureau (Tiger) report.  
Contiguity and neighborhoods in spatial analysis play vital roles (Tobler, 1970). To control 
for spillover effects of PM2.5 concentrations, 67 contiguous counties were included in our analysis. 
Wind map of the United States and World Forecast Directory, El Dorado Weather, Inc. are used to 
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make the weight matrix. Descriptive statistics for each variable are reported in Table 19 along with 
the expected signs of PM2.5 concentrations and the control variables.  
Table 19.  Descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Expected 
sign 
Asthma Hospitalization age-adjusted rate (per 10,000) 12.51 4.78 4.6 32  
Asthma Hospitalization crude rate (per 10,000) 13.00 4.88 4.6 31.4  
PM2.5 Concentrations (𝛍𝐠/𝐦𝟑) 12.23 2.42 7.8 23.3 + 
Smoking Rate (% of population age 18 and older) 19.67 2.95 9.04 25.7 + 
Precipitation (Inches) 46.03 8.54 24.73 83.86 + 
Per Capita Income (Thousand dollars) 33.725 8.343 18.263 75.835 - 
Population Density (Pop./mi2) 446.87 1,330.46 12.04 10,911.16 + 
Hispanic Population (Thousand people) 9.472 24.034 0.019 213.487 + 
Hispanic Population 19 and below (Thousand people) 3.811 9.467 0.008 78.000 + 
Number of observations 938  
 
Our motivation to work with a spatial model in this analysis is based upon air pollution 
movement tied to geographical distance. One should expect to see the residence of downwind 
locations being affected by air pollution levels from upwind areas. Before we analyze the model in 
a spatial regression framework, we used an intuitive way to identify asthma hospitalization rate 
clusters.  Figure 7 shows a map of asthma hospitalization rates for 2014, the last year of the dataset. 
Some spatial clusters are obvious in 2014. Philadelphia, Montgomery, Delaware and Bucks counties 
in the southeastern part of the state had asthma hospitalization rates in the highest category. In 
addition, there is another cluster of high category rates in the southwest part of the state.  Each cluster 
is associated with large metropolitan areas.    
 
 
 
 
 
109 
 
Figure 7. Asthma hospitalization rates in Pennsylvania 
counties, 2014 data 
 
The next step after visualizing asthma hospitalization among counties is to detect spatial 
autocorrelation. To test for asthma hospitalization rate autocorrelation, we applied the 1st-order 
spatial autoregressive (FAR) estimates code written by James P. LeSage, available through the 
spatial econometrics Toolbox for Matlab. FAR output includes the rho coefficients that indicates the 
autocorrelation between a dependent variable and a dependent variable in surrounding neighbors.  
Table 20 shows the results for the 1st-order spatial autoregressive estimates for two points of time 
and its z-probability. These tests reveal that there are significant spatial autocorrelations among 
counties in Pennsylvania. This means that Pennsylvania asthma hospitalization rates tend to be 
clustered together. 
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Table 20.  Results of 1st-order spatial autoregressive rho calculations for county level asthma 
hospitalization rates in Pennsylvania (age adjusted rates) 
 
 2001 2014 
Rho 0.961 0.980 
z-probability 0.000 0.000 
 
RESULTS 
The objective of this study is to investigate both the in-county and out-of-county effects of 
PM2.5 concentrations on asthma hospitalization.  To be able to respond to this question by estimating 
a two-way fixed effect spatial panel model, we tested the null hypothesis that the spillover effects of 
PM2.5 concentrations is statistically different from zero. As discussed in the previous sections, 
finding an accurate algorithm to deal with the spillover between pollutants and asthma matters. The 
weight matrix which defines the neighbors based on wind direction was determined to be the most 
accurate algorithm to investigate spillover effects of the pollution. To do a placebo test and check 
the reliability of the model, we tried applying a different weight matrix by using the reverse 
prevailing wind direction and the results shows statistically insignificant indirect effects. 
The estimated results for the model are reported in Table 21. We report the results following 
the crude rate asthma hospitalization.54  The PM2.5 concentrations variable has a positive and 
significant coefficient, meaning that there is a positive, within county correlation between PM2.5 
concentration and asthma hospitalization rates. A one μg/m3 increase in PM2.5 concentrations is 
associated with an estimated 0.71 per 10,000 population increase in the asthma hospitalization rate 
                                                 
54 We select the crude rate estimation as the most representative estimate of the existence of spillover effects from PM2.5 concentrations.  
This judgement is based on analyses using the number of county level asthma hospitalizations as a dependent variable, which consistently 
showed indirect effects were positive and statistically significant.   
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within the county where this increased concentration occurs.  The indirect effects of PM2.5 
concentrations are shown by the coefficient of PM2.5 concentrations in neighboring counties’ 
variable (Table 21). This coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level, meaning 
that asthma hospitalization rates increase with increasing PM2.5 concentrations in upwind counties. 
A one μg/m3 increase in PM2.5 concentrations in county i is associated with an estimated 0.12 per 
10,000 higher rate of asthma hospitalizations in downwind counties.   
Table 21. Asthma hospitalization estimation results for the SLX model 
Variable SLX model (age-adjusted rate) SLX model (crude rate) 
PM2.5 Concentrations 
0.697*** 
(0.000) 
0.712*** 
(0.000) 
Precipitation  
0.071*** 
 (0.000) 
0.073*** 
(0.000) 
Per Capita Income  
0.300*** 
 (0.000) 
0.303*** 
(0.000) 
Smoking Rate  
0.650*** 
 (0.000) 
0.654*** 
(0.000) 
Population Density  
0.001*** 
 (0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
PM2.5 Concentrations in neighboring 
counties 
0.062 
0.294 
0.119* 
(0.057) 
Constant  
-23.633*** 
(0.000) 
-24.234*** 
(0.000) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes 
County fixed effect Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.53 0.49 
Number of observations 938 938 
   Note: Numbers in the parentheses represent P-values  
   *, **, and *** refer to 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 
Other positive and statistically significant influences on asthma hospitalization include the 
percentage of smokers in a county and the density of the county’s population.  A 1% increase in 
smoking rate is associated with an increase of 0.65 per 10,000 population in asthma hospitalizations 
rate within a county.  The positive effects of higher population density, precipitation and per capita 
income are much smaller than smoking.   
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In addition to PM2.5 concentrations, the percentage of smokers in a county is another variable 
in our model that is alterable by public policy.  While neither the health effects of smoking nor PM2.5 
concentrations are limited to asthma prevalence (heart disease, stroke, cardiovascular disease, 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), and lung cancer increase with smoking), it is worth 
considering the comparative public health benefits from policies focusing on smoking rate reduction 
versus lowering of PM2.5 concentrations. We calculate the impacts of reducing both the smoking rate 
and PM2.5 concentrations by 10 percent from their current mean value over all counties. The results 
show that the effects of reducing PM2.5 concentrations on asthma hospitalization rates has less of an 
impact than reducing smoking rate (for example, 134 vs. 198 less hospitalizations in Philadelphia 
County). Finally, since the constant term in a fixed effect panel estimate that includes both year and 
county fixed effects is essentially not interpretable, we provide no explanation for the constant in 
this model.          
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
The objective of this study is to understand the asthma related health impacts from PM2.5 
concentrations. More specifically, the impact of PM2.5 concentrations on asthma hospitalization rates 
in Pennsylvania is investigated. A balanced panel of 67 counties in Pennsylvania over fourteen years 
(2001-2014) is applied to estimate the effects and capture the spillovers from PM2.5 concentrations 
on asthma hospitalization rates across counties. In this research, we identify an important aspect 
missing in the health impact analysis literature of ambient air pollution - the presence of statistically 
significant spatial autocorrelation among county level asthma hospitalization rates. This presence 
implies that the ordinary least square estimations (non-spatial models) may lead to a biased result 
and underestimate the overall impact of PM2.5 concentrations on asthma hospitalization rates. Spatial 
models incorporate the intercorrelation between county level PM2.5 concentrations and thereby 
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capture the spillover effects of these concentrations. In addition, applying spatial analysis without 
correctly employing wind direction to identify each unit’s neighbors also generates inaccurate 
estimations of PM2.5 concentrations impacts. Putting into practice the proper upwind and downwind 
relationships between counties within an ambient air pollution impact assessment is a key element 
to derive a precise impact estimations.      
Our results suggest that county level PM2.5 concentration is important explanatory factor in 
asthma hospitalization rates.  This finding is similar to the findings of numerous studies, including 
Glad et al. (2012), Mann et al (2010), Meng et al (2010), Liu et al. (2009), Jacquemin et al. (2012), 
Malig et al. (2013), Samoli et al. (2011), and Silverman et al. (2010). While there are several GIS-
based studies focused on the locational impacts of asthma (Yap et al., 2013; Crighton et al., 2012; 
Hanchette et al., 2011), asthma hospitalization impacts from PM2.5 concentrations occurring in 
upwind counties have not been discussed in the literature before.  
From Table 21 results, a one 𝛍𝐠/𝐦𝟑 increase in PM2.5 concentrations is associated with a 
combined asthma hospitalization rate increase of 0.8 per 10,000 population within both the county 
itself where the increase occurs as well as in downwind counties.  Considering the average charge 
for inpatient hospitalization in Pennsylvania ($26,952), the total annual cost from a one μg/m3 
increase in PM2.5 concentrations in Philadelphia county (the most urban county in Pennsylvania) is 
$3.1 million. Conversely, the total annual cost such an increase in PM2.5 concentrations in the most 
rural county (Cameron) is $37,732.  
We estimate the impact of this same one μg/m3 increase throughout all Pennsylvania 
counties on the number of asthma hospitalization using 2014 data.  A total of 1,244 additional asthma 
hospitalizations would occur with 26.8% of these hospitalizations happening in downwind counties 
because of increased PM2.5 concentrations in upwind neighboring counties. Using the average cost 
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of asthma hospitalization noted above, the additional cost is $33.51 million with $8.9 million being 
added due to spillover effects of PM2.5 concentrations.  Thus, ambient air pollution represents a 
regional issue rather than one related specifically to attainment or non-attainment of air quality 
standards at the county level. 
This study’s findings have policy implications for both federal and local governments. In 
December 2012, EPA reduced PM pollution standards by tightening the annual PM2.5 standard from 
15 to 12 𝜇𝑔/𝑚3.  Even small changes at lowering the standard could have significant impacts on 
public health. Giannadaki et al. (2016) note that governments continue to adopt stricter limits for 
annual mean PM2.5 level.  As shown in this research, lower limits for PM2.5 concentrations lead to 
substantial reductions in at least one negative human health outcome - asthma hospitalizations.   
Although ambient air pollution has gained more attention for many years and there has been 
implementation of many regulations and air quality standards to help control pollution levels, still 
more work needs to be done. As one example, if the existing method to calculate the PM2.5-
attributable health effects is not capturing the spillover effects, the findings from this study show that 
inclusion of the out of area health effects of PM2.5 concentrations are potentially important in the 
consideration of setting or revising primary PM standards. Because the regulation of pollutants is an 
economic burden for the power generation sector and society in general (Curtis 2018), the most 
accurate accounting of human health effects is needed when considering pollution standard 
reductions – i.e. those which incorporate spillovers effects. Since nonattainment designations along 
with their incumbent increased regulation on pollution dischargers happen at city and county levels, 
the spillover benefits from these additional regulations need to be considered as the human health 
impacts of air pollution knows no boundaries.   
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Several limitations in the research are recognized.  First, to account for wind patterns, future 
research should consider a more detailed algorithm that involves wind speed and wind rose when 
computing a weight matrix. Wind rose is a diagram that shows the relative frequency of wind 
direction in a particular place. In practice, wind direction and speed change over time, so to 
investigate the effects of ambient air pollution, one needs to continually adjust the neighbors 
according to the frequency of wind direction and speed. For this research, corresponding information 
about direction and speed were not available for each county and each year. Thus, the empirical 
results found here may change with more accurate data of wind patterns. The weak statistically 
significant indirect effect of PM2.5 concentrations could be an indicator showing that this analysis 
might benefit from generating a more precise wind direction weight matrix.    
Second, asthma hospitalization is currently the only data available at the county level for 
Pennsylvania. Access to asthma prevalence and asthma emergency department visits data for 
conducting new estimations using these asthma related incidents would provide researchers with a 
better estimation of PM2.5 impacts.  
Finally, expanding the study region by applying all U.S. counties will provide a better 
understanding of the health impacts of the pollution.  Unfortunately, data for all the counties in the 
U.S. are not available in this point. Having access to these point data pollution levels may enable the 
researchers to achieve results that are more accurate. Unfortunately, the pollution data for points in 
county level in a time series is not readily available. One would expect point source data on pollution 
show greater effects on asthma hospitalization.   
Further research should consider improving on the above limitations by imposing a more 
accurate wind pattern, expanding estimations to include emergency department visits and asthma 
prevalence, and a county level analysis on the national level are recommended for future works. The 
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current outcome does contribute to the literature by examining the impact of ambient air pollution 
on human health by specifically documenting and estimating the cost of asthma spillover effects 
across Pennsylvania counties from PM2.5 concentrations.  
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Appendix VII. 
Figure 8. Attainment vs. nonattainment designation status in Pennsylvania counties based on 
PM2.5 concentrations criteria. 
 
Note:  Using the data from EPA Green Book, National Area and County-Level Multi-Pollutant Information, we define attainment vs. nonattainment counties 
based on the PM2.5 concentrations criteria. If the county falls in a nonattainment status in any years between 2001 and 2014, we consider it a nonattainment county, otherwise 
the county falls in an attainment status. 
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CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Study Summary 
Spatial econometrics has an important role to play in research (see e.g., Partridge et 
al. (2012) for a general discussion of the importance of spatial econometrics).1  By applying 
spatial models in three different research areas, I demonstrate in this dissertation the use of 
conventional, non-spatial analyses are biased in this environment. Overall, due to a 
significant spatial autoregressive component found in all models (water charge and minimum 
monthly access from essay 1, opioid overdose deaths and the Naloxone access law in essay 
2, and PM2.5 concentration and asthma hospitalization in essay 3), I found spillover effects 
exist in all three topics.  The existence of spillover effects can lead federal and local 
policymakers to a better understanding of the impacts of policies and strategies they make 
for their jurisdiction on the neighboring regions.  
In the first essay, I found that water charges in municipality level are influenced by 
long-term debt and the water source.  Also, water charge follows a spatial pattern so that 
municipalities and the PSC are adjusting water rates considering water charges from 
neighboring utilities. It could be the results of geographical and institutional characteristics 
or following the rates in neighboring municipalities.  For the second model in essay 1, the 
question considered is whether or not socioeconomic factors are considered to set the 
                                                 
1 For more information, please refer to Gibbons and Overman (2012), McMillen (2012), and Corrado and Fingleton 
(2012). 
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minimum water access. The results showed affordability is not a significant factor to predict 
and explain the minimum access charge.  
 Second essay investigated the impacts of a public health policy (Naloxone access 
law) on opioid overdose deaths in the U.S.  Aside from findings that show heroin availability, 
opioid prescriptions, high-risk occupations, population density, and college graduate rate are 
the influential factors to determine the opioid overdose deaths, I found while Naloxone 
access law doesn’t impact the opioid overdose death rate in the state which a law is 
implemented, there are positive spillover effects on death rates in surrounding states.  
In the third essay I presented a new approach to evaluate the effects of ambient air 
pollution on health outcome.  To be more specific I considered the spillover effects of PM2.5 
concentrations on asthma hospitalization in Pennsylvania counties.  The results showed that 
the PM2.5 concentrations in county i impacts on the asthma hospitalization in downwind 
counties.   
In the next part based on the results I will explain the policy implication for each 
essay.  
Implications 
The findings of the study have some policy implications for both federal and local 
governments.  Findings from first essay highlighted the role of financial constraint and source 
of water in water charge determination.  According to the results protecting ground water 
quality with source water protection programs seems a reasonable strategy to control and 
keep the water charge low.  Our water charge model results provide the basis for a rough 
estimate of the benefits from this ground water protection.  Allowing for a $5 saving for each 
4,500 gallons of use, the over 240,000 households in West Virginia served by municipalities 
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using ground water have an annual cost savings of $3.6 million in their water charges 
compared to other water sources.  
In terms of the long term debt, prior to the 1987 amendments to the Clean Water Act, 
municipal utility assistance was provided through grants with the federal government picking 
up 55% of project cost.  This amendment changed grants to low-interest rate loans.  This 
change means that now local governments are responsible for 100% of projects’ cost 
(Copeland, 1999).  This societal change of replacing the federal government grants to 
municipal utilities with low-interest loans has increased long term utility debt, which has 
increased water charges to customers.  
Also our results indicate that the average share of water costs across West Virginia 
households with municipal water utilities is about 1.5% of household income devoted to 
water charges with a maximum share being 4%.  With such reasonable costs of water for 
households, this could be a factor explaining why our models find no significant effects from 
socioeconomic factors on monthly minimum charges for access to water. 
Findings from the second essay have profound implications for Naloxone access law 
policy.  For the provisions with positive coefficients we find that in each case the effect of 
Naloxone access laws is to increase opioid death rates outside the states where these laws 
have been enacted.  Looking across multiple provisions, these findings provide no statistical 
evidence that these laws reduce opioid death rates.   
Our results show that when access laws are evaluated in isolation of any other state 
level policy response to opioids, increasing access to Naloxone does not reduce, but leads to 
increased overdose death rates.  Thus, the moral hazard perspective of this policy is the more 
accurate assessment of the outcome when access laws are evaluated as the only policy.  
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Immunity from civil and criminal liability for healthcare professionals and immunity from 
criminal liability for possession of Naloxone are provisions that show the change in behavior 
of the users and we see a positive effect of these laws on opioid overdose death rates.  The 
end result is that while administering Naloxone prevents an overdose death, the expanded 
ability to administer Naloxone does not reduce overdose death rates.  Enactment of a 
Naloxone access law is a starting point in implementing and expanding access to save lives 
seems a necessary strategy, but not a sufficient response to the overdose problem. 
Findings from the third essay highlighted the role of external sources of PM2.5 
concentrations in upwind counties on asthma hospitalization in downwind counties. 
Although ambient air pollution has gained more attention for many years and has led to the 
implementation of many regulations and air quality standards to help control the level of 
pollution, more work still needs to be done.  If the existing method to calculate the PM2.5-
attributable health effects is not capturing the spillovers, this study recommends the inclusion 
of the indirect health effects of PM2.5 concentrations to set or revise the primary PM 
standards.  Because the regulation of pollutants is an economic burden for the power 
generation sector and society, the most real and accurate human health effects need to be 
measured.  
An accurate measurement of pollutants should incorporate spillovers.  The real cost 
involving asthma hospitalization is not limited to the discharge within the county; this is true 
in the state level as well.  Even if a local government manages to decrease the ambient air 
pollution, public health may still be influenced by pollution levels in neighboring units.  To 
control ambient air pollution, this study recommends regional cooperation rather than a state 
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regulation.  Both federal and local governments should be involved in policies more focused 
on regions rather than a specific state or county. 
Study Limitation  
I recognize several limitations in my research.  First, the data available for the water 
plants locations in the first essay is limited.  The best way to model geographical 
characteristics is having access to the water plants locations. Spatial interpolation methods 
such as Kriging may help us to predict the location point with a high degree of confidence.  
In the second essay, many states have only recently enacted Naloxone access laws.  
Since our data cover years 1999 to 2016, for those 10 states with newly enacted laws in 2014, 
we do not have post implementation data.  Furthermore, 10 more states enacted laws in 2013, 
so that only one year of data is included in our dataset.  Empirical results may change with 
more post implementation data for these 20 states.  Second, county level analysis would be 
preferable to assess the spillover effects across states, but these data were not consistently 
available for public for overdose death rates.  Religion and social attitude toward drugs may 
have influences on overdose death rates. Empirical results may change after controlling for 
these variables.  Future works may consider dynamic spatial models.  Empirical results may 
change with the new method of estimation.  
For the third essay, first, to account for wind patterns, researchers need to consider a 
more accurate algorithm that involves wind speed and wind rose.  Wind rose is a diagram 
that shows the relative frequency of wind direction in a particular place.  In practice, wind 
direction and speed could change over time, so to investigate the effects of ambient air 
pollution, one needs to adjust the neighbors according to the frequency of wind direction and 
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speed.  For this research, I do not have corresponding information for each county and each 
year.  Empirical results may change with more accurate data for wind patterns.   
Second, asthma hospitalization is currently the only data available on a county level for 
Pennsylvania.  Having access to asthma prevalence and asthma emergency department visits 
and conducting new estimations for this asthma related incidents would give us a better 
estimation of the impact.  Occupational pattern may affect the asthma hospitalization. For 
instance, coal miners are more exposed to asthma prevalence.  In addition, age group could 
affect asthma hospitalization.  Children and elderly people suffer from a higher rate of asthma 
prevalence.  Results may change after controlling for occupation scheme and age groups.  
Controlling for some kind of measurement for the road pollution is the area, which remains 
for the future works.  Having access to the point data pollutions may enable the researchers 
to have results that are more accurate.  Unfortunately, the pollution data for points in county 
level in a time series is not readily available.  One can expect point source data on pollution 
show greater effects on asthma hospitalization.  Finally, a study region applying all the 
counties in the U.S. will give us a better understanding of the health impacts of the pollution.  
Unfortunately, data for asthma hospitalization for all the counties in the U.S. is not available 
in this point. 
